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TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
RELIGIOUS GROUP RIGHTS
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*
In this Article, Professor Gedicks advocates strong constitutional protection
of the right of religious groups to discriminate in membership decisions. The author
draws from two employment discrimination cases recently decided by the Supreme
Court, Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. and Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop v Amos. Using these cases, the author illustrates the tension
that presently exists between religious group claims to autonomy, on the one hand,
and individual rights and government interests, on the other hand.
The author admits that granting stronger constitutional protection to the right
of religious groups to discriminate in membership decisions will result in the protec-
tion of beliefs and practices which will be inconsistent with and even repugnant to the
majority. This is the paradox of groups-while subverting individual autonomy,
groups nevertheless enhance individual autonomy by challenging the liberal power of
the sovereign state. The author concludes that if one is genuinely concerned about
threats to individual freedom, one has more to fear from unlimited governmental
power than from a strong right of religious group autonomy; it is the latter that will
serve as a check on the former.
I. INTRODUCTION
Few aspects of life in the United States are more celebrated than
the religious diversity of American society.' Americans usually attrib-
* Associate Professor, Mercer University School of Law. B.A., Brigham Young
University, 1977; J.D., University of Southern California, 1980. I presented an earlier version of
Parts III and IV-A at a meeting of the Religious Institutions Section of the National Association of
College and University Attorneys in Baltimore, Maryland; in June 1986, and an earlier version of
Part IV-B at a workshop co-sponsored by the Center for Constitutional Studies of Mercer
University and the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Washington,
D.C., in February 1988. I benefited from comments by Bruce Hafen, William Marshall, Michael
Perry, Jefferson Powell, ivan Rutledge, Jack Sammons, Rodney Smith, Steven Smith, and, in
particular, my good friend and colleague Ted Blumoff. Larry Stewart provided excellent research
assistance. All errors that remain are mine.
i. The YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN CHURCHES 1987 (C. Jacquet, Jr. ed.
1987) lists 218 distinct religious bodies and 345,961 churches in the United States. Id. at 252; see
also id. at 21-122 (listing and describing each religious body). The table of contents of F. MEAD,
HANDBOOK OF DENOMINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (6th ed. 1975) lists 103 separate religious
denominations in the United States, with 156 additional subgroups. See also T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR
& B. CHADWICK, ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN MIDDLETOWN'S RELIGION
310 (1983) [hereinafter ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE] (finding 160 different denominations represented in
a city of 79,932); A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 8 (1985) (listing mainline Prot-
estants, Roman Catholics, white evangelical Protestants, black Protestants, Jews, Mormons, Or-
thodox Christians, Christian Scientists, Adventists, and Black Muslims as the "significant" Ameri-
can religious groups). Relative to the rest of the Western world, the United States has been
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ute this diversity to the principles of religious freedom and of separa-
tion of church and state that are embodied in the religion clauses of the
United States Constitution.2 Nevertheless, our self-congratulation on
this attribute disguises a deep and fundamental contradiction between
vigorous religious pluralism and the modem liberal state. This contra-
diction, if left unresolved, will threaten meaningful religious freedom.
American liberalism, with its uncompromising focus on state and
individual, often overlooks institutions like religious groups that are
neither governmental nor individualistic. Moreover, American public
culture has grown increasingly secular in the twentieth century. Both
liberalism and secularization suggest a society that is not hospitable to
religious groups. Although Americans remain actively and profoundly
religious in their private lives,3 little evidence of this religiosity leaks
exceptionally pluralist in matters of religion from its earliest political origins. See generally T.
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT chs. 1-3 (1986); A. REICHLEY, supra, at 170-77.
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof..... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Empirical studies have consistently demonstrated a high level of commitment among
contemporary Americans to traditional religious beliefs, practices, and institutions. For example,
recent polls have reported that 91% of Americans state a religious preference, 71% claim member-
ship in a church or a synagogue, 58 % to 61% believe that religion can solve all or most of today's
problems, 57% have high levels of confidence in organized religion, 55% to 56% state that religion
is very important and 31 % that religion is fairly important in their lives, and 40% to 42% attend a
church or a synagogue during a typical week. G. GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION
1986, at 6, 9-10, 15, 127, 272-73, 280 (1987); G. GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION
1985, at 120-21, 162, 291 (1986) [hereinafter THE GALLUP POLL 1985]. THE CONNECTICUT MUTUAL
LIFE REPORT ON AMERICAN VALUES IN THE '80S: THE IMPACT OF BELIEF (1981), found that 74% of
Americans consider themselves religious, and 49% can identify a specific time in their adult lives
when they made "a personal commitment to Christ" that changed their lives. Id. at 41, 42. It also
found that 73% of Americans frequently feel that God loves them, 57% frequently engage in
prayer, 44% frequently attend religious services, 28% frequently read the Bible, 25% frequently
participate in church socials, 23% frequently encourage others to be religious, 21% frequently
listen to religious broadcasts, and 26% frequently engage in or experience at least five of these
activities and feelings. Id. at 42, 43. ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE, supra note 1, an in-depth sociological
study of religious belief and practice in Muncie, Indiana, from 1924 to 1978, found that among
married couples, rates of activity and membership in churches are higher than those of any other
social organization. Id. at 84, 309 (74% of married women and 61% of married men belong to a
church, and 59% and 43%, respectively, actively participate in a church). The study also found
that charitable contributions to churches were more than four times greater than those to secular
charities. Id. at 84-86, 309 (3.3% of family income versus 0.8%). In a recent survey of average
weekly church attendance conducted in 24 countries worldwide, the United States, with a 43%
attendance rate, trailed only Malta (91%), the Republic of Ireland (72%), Mexico (54%), North-
ern Ireland (52%), and white South Africa (50%). YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
CHURCHES 1987, supra note 1, at 286.
The religious devotion of post-World War II America reached its peak in the 1950s, de-
clined during the 1960s and early 1970s, and recovered during the late 1970s and the 1980s, al-
though it has not returned to 1950s levels. THE GALLUP POLL 1985, supra, at vii, ix, 121, 292; R.
FLOWERS, RELIGION IN STRANGE TIMES: THE 1960s AND 1970s 36-43 (1984); Gallup, 50 Years of
Gallup Surveys on Religion, THE GALLUP REP., May 1985, at 4-5 [hereinafter Gallup, 50 Years].
ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE, supra note i, argues that there is no empirical support for the ubiquitous
hypothesis that increasing secularization is an inevitable and irreversible long-term trend and as-
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into the public sphere of law and politics. Similarly, although the
United States is undoubtedly among the most religiously plural of con-
temporary democracies, the inexorable expansion of modern American
government at every level places increasing pressure on religious groups
to compromise their beliefs and values to conform to government poli-
cies.4 The continuing difficulty is defining the point at which further
government encroachment upon religious group interests should be
constitutionally prohibited in order to preserve freedom and diversity.
Two employment discrimination cases recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court, Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc.' and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 6 illustrate the contradiction between religious pluralism and
modem liberalism. Both cases were the result of legal action by former
employees of religious institutions who had been dismissed for failing
to adhere to religious standards of conduct imposed by the institutions
as a condition of continued employment.
serts that the American tendency in the twentieth century has been toward more, rather than less,
religious activity and devotion. Id. at 26-30, 33-38, 294-300; see also id. at 80-81, 84-86, 308-09.
According to Gallup:
Perhaps the most appropriate word to use to describe the religious character of the na-
tion as a whole over the last half century is "stability." Basic religious beliefs, and even
religious practice, differ relatively little from the levels recorded 50 years ago. In fact, the
nation has in some respects remained remarkably orthodox-even fundamentalist-in
its beliefs.
Gallup, 50 Years, supra, at 5.
ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE, supra note 1, attributes the persistence of the secularization hypothe-
sis to the paucity and unreliability of pre-World War II data, the anti- or areligious bias of those
scholars-Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel-who had the greatest influence on the
development of modern sociology, and the habitual reconstruction of a nonexistent American past
in which "everyone went to church and the rules of morality were universally respected." Id. at 5,
20-26, 30-32.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Civil Rights Restoration Act, 102
Stat. 28 (1987) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687, 1688; 29 U.S.C. §§ 709,794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-
4a, 6107). See also Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); and infra text accompanying
notes 200-02. This pressure can take the form of direct regulation, as when the government seeks
to prohibit or to require certain conduct by religious groups, or indirect regulation, as when the
government provides incentives or disincentives to certain conduct by religious groups by specify-
ing prerequisites to receipt of federal benefits or to avoidance of federal regulation. Compare Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (reviewing state compulsory school attendance law) with Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (reviewing revocation of tax-exempt status).
This Article deals only with direct regulation of religious groups. For an overview of indirect
governmental regulation by attaching conditions to receipt of government funds, see Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103 (1987).
5. 477 U.S. 619 (1986), rev'g 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'g 578 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.
Ohio 1984).
6. 483 U.S. 327 (1987), rev'g 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985) and 594 F. Supp. 791
(D. Utah 1984).
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In Dayton Christian Schools, the Court reviewed an action for a
declaratory judgment that Ohio's Civil Rights Act7 could not constitu-
tionally be applied to the decision of a private fundamentalist Christian
school not to renew the contract of a pregnant, married teacher. The
school had taken this action because of its religious belief that mothers
with preschool children should not work outside their homes.' Under
the authority of the Act, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission investi-
gated a complaint by the teacher, found probable cause to conclude
that the school had violated the Act, and proposed a consent order to
be entered into by the school in lieu of prosecution. Among other reme-
dies, the order required full reinstatement of the teacher with back
pay.9
The facts of Dayton Christian Schools posed a dilemma. On the
one hand, the teacher suffered a loss of employment because of action
that the legislature had declared unlawful through the Act. Exempting
the school from the Act, and thereby upholding the school's refusal to
reinstate the teacher, would have significantly injured the teacher. On
the other hand, those who make up the community of Dayton Christian
Schools-the people who work there, who send their children there,
who attend school there, who teach there, who set the policy of the
school and manage its assets-had created a unique form of educa-
tion."0 Indeed, all associated with the school, including the com-
plaining teacher, highly valued the distinctive religious beliefs reflected
in its educational philosophy." Requiring the reinstatement of the
teacher would force the school to accommodate a course of conduct
that it believed was wrong and would prevent the school from effec-
tively teaching one aspect of its distinctive religious philosophy.' 2 This
disposition would implicate the constitutional free exercise and associa-
tional rights of those connected with the school. It also would dilute
religious pluralism, by forcing upon the school conformity to
majoritarian values and practices relating to gender discrimination.' 3
7. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.1 1, 4112.99 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1986).
8. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 623; 766 F.2d at 934 & n.2.
9. Id., 477 U.S. at 624.
10. See Dayton Christian Schools, 766 F.2d at 936-38 & nn. 7-10.
11. See id. at 947, 949 nn. 28-29.
12. See id. at 949, 950, 951-52; and infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
13. Dayton Christian Schools typifies situations in which the government interest in elim-
inating religious discrimination does not coincide with the individual complainant's interest in
associating with a particular kind of religious group while being free from one form of such dis-
crimination. In these cases, the complainant wishes to be personally free from discrimination, but
otherwise wishes the group preserved intact. Governmental anti-discrimination remedies, how-
ever, can change the fundamental character of the group in ways that would be objectionable even
to the complainant. See infra text accompanying notes 57-78. Often, however, government and
individual anti-discrimination interests coincide. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 327; see infra text
accompanying notes 244-65.
Religious Group Rights
The Supreme Court has been unclear in explaining why and to
what extent assertions of religious belief and exercise should insulate
one from the effects of generally applicable law.' 4 Thus, it came as no
surprise when the Court chose federal abstention as the better part of
doctrinal valor in disposing of Dayton Christian Schools.'" By invoking
abstention doctrine, the Court avoided the need to explain when and
why a religious exemption from generally applicable law is constitu-
tionally required by the free exercise clause. However, in the very next
term, the Court was confronted with Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos,16 which presented the converse issue: whether a religious exemp-
tion that is not constitutionally required by the free exercise clause is
constitutionally prohibited by the establishment clause?
In Amos, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, more
commonly known as the Mormon church, had terminated a longtime
custodial employee of the church-owned and church-operated Deseret
Gym because of his failure to obtain a "temple recommend"-an eccle-
siastical certification that the holder subscribes to certain important
Mormon beliefs and practices and is thereby eligible to worship in Mor-
mon temples.'" The employee challenged his termination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 He argued that Congress' exemp-
tion of all activities of religious institutions-the secular as well as the
religious-from compliance with Title VII 9 constituted a religious
preference in violation of the establishment clause.2 °
The Supreme Court did not decide whether the religious exemp-
tion of Title VII was required by the free exercise clause.2' Observing
that " '[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are
by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the
14. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) and United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) with Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See
generally Kelley, Introduction, in GOvERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRs 3, 4-7 (D.
Kelley ed. 1982) [hereinafter GOVERNmENT INTERvENrnoN].
15. The Court held that the district court should have abstained from adjudicating the
case under the principle enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny.
Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 625. The Court has recently begun to rely on the "passive
virtues" in disposing of religion clause cases. In addition to Dayton Christian Schools, see Karcher
v. May, 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987) (lack of standing); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475
U.S. 534 (1986) (lack of standing).
16. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
17. 483 U.S. at 330 & n.4.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to -17 (1982).
19. § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
20. Amos, 483 U.S. at 331 (discussing § 702).
21. See id. at 339 n.17.
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Free Exercise Clause,"2 2 the Court held that under the Lemon test 23 the
religious exemption did not violate the establishment clause.24 Amos
clarified for the moment that religious exemptions from generally appli-
cable law are permitted by the establishment clause even when not man-
dated by the free exercise clause.
However, the majority opinion largely ignored the constitutional
tension between individual, government, and group that was as clearly
present in Amos as it was in Dayton Christian Schools. 25 The Amos em-
ployee suffered significant harm because of religious discrimination
made possible by the exemption to Title VII. Notwithstanding the reli-
gious exemption, permitting such individual harm in the face of the
general anti-discrimination purpose of Title VII seems contradictory to
the goal of the Civil Rights Act of which Title VII is a part, as well as to
the spirit of both religion clauses. Yet, if the exemption had been struck
down as unconstitutional, the Mormon church would be forced to ac-
cept as employees people who do not subscribe to the highest behav-
ioral and ethical standards of Mormonism.
The Court has yet to articulate a theory explaining how this ten-
sion among individual, government, and religious group should be re-
solved. The questions remain how and to what extent individual rights
and government interests should be vindicated at the expense of the
claims of religious groups, and when these rights and interests should
be subordinated to religious group claims. These questions dog the
Court's religion clause cases and are at the heart of the doctrinal confu-
sion that characterizes the Court's decisions in this area.
26
22. Id. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
23. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court synthesized 25
years of establishment clause analysis into the well-known three-pronged test. To escape constitu-
tional invalidation, government action challenged under the clause must be shown to have "a
secular legislative purpose," id. at 612, to have "[a] principal or primary effect [which] neither
advances nor inhibits religion," id., and not to "foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion,'" id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
24. Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
We find unpersuasive... that [the exemption] singles out religious entities for a benefit.
Although the Court has given weight to this consideration in its past decisions.... it has
never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious groups are per se
invalid.... Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regula-
tion that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption
comes packaged with benefits to secular entities.
Id. The Court also held that the religious exemption had a secular purpose, id. at 335-36, and did
not impermissibly entangle church and state, id. at 339.
25. But cf. id. at 337 ("The case before us... involves a nonprofit activity instituted over
75 years ago in the hope that 'all who assemble here, and who come for the benefit of their health
and for physical blessing, [may] feel that they are in a house dedicated to the Lord.' ") (quoting
Dedicatory Prayer for Gymnasium). Throughout this Article, when discussing religious groups, I
presuppose that they have a nonprofit status.
26. See Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious
Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 373 (1984); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Both Dayton Christian Schools and Amos involved a religious
group membership decision-whether to associate with an individual in
such a way that the individual will be considered part of the group.27
Drawing in part from a concurring opinion by Justice Brennan in
Amos, 28 I will argue that in such cases the individual-government-reli-
gious group tension should be resolved by deferring to the group, even
at the cost of infringing upon important individual and government
anti-discrimination interests. By discriminating in decisions about
whom they admit and retain as members, religious groups define and
communicateotheir fundamental concerns. Despite the prejudice and
mean-spiritedness sometimes implicit in such discrimination, it is neces-
sary if meaningful religious pluralism is to survive and individuals and
society are to enjoy religious pluralism's considerable benefits. 29 Un-
fortunately, these benefits are not always recognized in contemporary
society. This Article challenges the bias of liberal theory in favor of
government power and individual rights and the modern trend toward
secularization in public life. Both liberal bias and secularization suggest
that in constitutional confrontations between individual, government,
and religious group, the religious group's interest in self-definition often
will be overshadowed by individual and government interests in non-
discrimination.30 Not unexpectedly, then, current theories of constitu-
tional law afford incomplete protection to the interest of religious
groups in self-definition. 3 1 Nevertheless, constitutional recognition of a
strong right of religious group autonomy in making membership deci-
See also Tribe, Church and State in the Constitution, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, supra note 14,
at 31, 32:
mhe point at which the two [religion] clauses most powerfully reinforce each other is the
very point at which the conflict between them is most profound. That is the point ... at
which religious passion and the expression of religious conviction and conduct emerge
from the crucible of faith as theological community: the congregational or hierarchical
collectivity that interposes itself as an autonomous group between the individual and the
state. It is at this point that all of the tensions [and paradoxes] of the religion clauses
come into focus.
27. The question whether someone "belongs" to a group cannot be answered merely by
looking at an official membership list. Religious groups associate with individuals in a variety of
ways beyond formal membership that nevertheless result in such individuals being considered part
of the group. Employees are often seen as part of the religious group that employs them regardless
of formal church affiliation or activity, as both Dayton Christian Schools and Amos illustrate. See
infra note 71. In contrast, many of those who appear on a religious group's membership list may
have so little current contact or activity with the group that they should not be considered part of
it, formal membership notwithstanding.
28. Amos, 483 U.S. at 340-46. I discuss Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in detail
infra at text accompanying notes 195-97.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
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sions is necessary to preserve religious pluralism and the individual au-
tonomy that is at the heart of liberalism. 32
II. SELF-DEFINITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF MEANING IN RELIGIOUS
GROUPS
Liberal political theory has long treated groups as aggregations of
individuals bound together by some a priori set of self-conscious indi-
vidual decisions, such as those implicit in contractual or quasi-contrac-
tual relations.3 3 Under liberal presuppositions, societies are formed
and maintained principally by individuals. Individuals do not merely
belong to groups, they create them.34
Certainly, the identity of any group qua group must derive to some
extent from its members. If the group members have nothing in com-
mon in any significant aspect of their existence, it makes no conceptual
sense to think of them as an entity. The collective description of the
group members implied by treating them as an aggregation presumes
the existence of generally shared characteristics or agreements. 35 Al-
most by definition, the members of any group will share a commitment
to one or more concerns, whose validity and importance to these mem-
bers are not questioned.36 A "group," then, is a collectivity or commu-
32. See infra Part V. My use of the terms "liberal" and "liberalism" refers to the political
tradition based on the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and others that posits a morally neu-
tral, impartial, and objective state whose primary purpose is to maintain social order and stability
among the individuals whom it governs so that each of them may otherwise exercise free choice.
33. See A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 220-21 (2d ed. 1984). See generally Frug, The City
as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1089 (1980) (analogizing the tension between medieval
towns and their inhabitants to that between corporate entities and their individual members). In
discussing how constitutional law relates to religious groups, some commentators seem not to
have considered the possibility that groups are formed and maintained on noncontractual bases.
See, e.g., ElIman, Driven From the' Tribunal. Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1378 (1981); Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980).
34. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (discussing ways group factions in
church property dispute could alter outcome by modifying founding charter).
35. See W. MCDOUGALL, THE GROUP MIND 25 (1920); Frug, supra note 33, at 1147
(quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 979 (1978)); Marshall, Discrimination and the
Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 68, 89-90 (1986).
36. See D. FUNK, GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: INTEGRATING CONSTITUTIVE CONTRACT INSTI-
TUTONS 7, 34, 90 n. 1 (1982); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 558 (1985) [hereinafter Perry, Constitu-
tional Interpretation]; see, e.g., S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 36-37, 66 (1981). See
generally J. ORTEGA, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 6 (A. Kerrigan trans. 1985); Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 929 (1963); Ortega y Gasset, Concord
and Liberty, in J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, CONCORD AND LIBERTY 9, 16-19 (H. Weyl trans. 1963). I do
not mean here that the group necessarily believes these concerns to be objectively true or real,
although many groups, especially religious ones, do indeed hold such beliefs about their core con-
cerns. Often, the concern that binds the group together is a provisional belief that members under-
stand can be changed over time. The shared concern may be as narrow as a consensus about the
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nity of individuals who hold in common a set of foundational beliefs
and experiences, the relevance and significance of which are generally
thought beyond challenge. These core group concerns delineate the
boundaries of group membership by embodying the essential defining
characteristics of the group.37
Although accurate in some respects, this model of groups is sim-
plistic and incomplete. Groups are often so large and complex that they
are significantly shaped by the actions of individuals only in the grossest
sense. In fact, the dynamic is commonly the opposite. Groups are ongo-
ing and independent entities that influence in their own right how indi-
viduals think, express themselves, and act. 38 Although in some respects
groups are aggregations of their individual members, in other respects
groups are prior to and independent of their members.39
Groups do not spring forth unbidden from a social vacuum, fully
mature and complete with charter, by-laws, and mission. The process of
group formation is long and subtle. It often is impossible to pinpoint
the discrete time and place at which a particular group came into being.
Over time, individuals are attracted or become acclimated to particular
beliefs and experiences that are made relatively more powerful and ap-
pealing by the social context in which they appear. Eventually, the com-
mon lives of these individuals will have sufficiently coalesced to enable
identification of a community centered on these individuals' beliefs and
experiences as core group concerns.4 °
The "social contract" model of group formation, then, is often ir-
relevant in contemporary life. The vast majority of modem humanity
does not consciously engage in any process of group creation. 4' Many
of the significant groups in contemporary society42 claim pedigrees that
relevance of a particular text, such as the New Testament, even though agreement about its mean-
ing is not forthcoming. See S. HAUERWAS, supra, at 60; White, The Text, Interpretation, and Criti-
cal Standards, 60 TEX. L. Rv. 569, 573, 579 (1982) [hereinafter White, Critical Standards].
37. See Marshall, supra note 35, at 91. See also White, Law as Language: Reading Law
and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415, 416 (1982) [hereinafter White, Law as Language].
38. Note, Reinterpreting the Religious Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Concep-
tions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1473 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Reinterpreting the Religious
Clauses]; see also E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SociETY 36 (2d ed. 1963); W. McDOUGALL, supra
note 35, at 7, 9.
39. W. McDOUGALL, supra note 35, at 7, 9, 21-22; Garet, Communality and Existence:
The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 1052 (1983); Note, Reinterpreting the Religious
Clauses, supra note 38, at 1471; Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1606, 1749 (1987) [hereinafter Religion and the State].
40. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. Rev. 4, 14 (1983).
41. See Garet, supra note 39, at 1043.
42. Examples of such groups, in addition to churches and religious groups, include fami-
lies, political parties and activist groups, cities and other local government units, labor unions,
corporations, and educational, charitable and other not-for-profit institutions.
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stretch far back in time.43 Members of such groups do not view their
continued attraction to the group's core concerns as creating the group.
In most cases, the group is "already there." 44 Rather, members ap-
proach the group's core concerns in terms of maintenance rather than
creation. The question is whether a group's historical core concerns
should continue to be those characteristics that define the group. As
society evolves and the social context that made particular core con-
cerns initial magnets for community formation and maintenance disap-
pears, members of communities centered around those concerns are
challenged to decide to what extent the concerns remain relevant to
their individual and group lives.45 Core concerns that have become so-
cially or otherwise problematic may be reinterpreted or discarded by a
group in order to reduce the discontinuity between the group's core
concerns and the norms and values of the larger society from which
most groups must draw their members.4 6
The constant and continual reexaminations and reinterpretations
by a group of its core concerns build a narrative consisting of the inten-
tions, commitments, beliefs, settings, images, and stories relating to the
group.4 7 Narrative is particularly important for religious groups. A
group's narrative is its vision of itself, of what its members aspire to be
both individually and communally.48 Shared by all of a religious
group's members to some extent, the narrative constitutes the interpre-
tive structure against which those members assess the meaning of their
lives. 49 Because core concerns are the definitive referent for determin-
ing who is and who is not a member of the group, the group's narrative
exerts considerable force on those who value group membership.
Again, this is especially true of religious groups, for a religious narra-
tive is a source of moral authority in the lives of those who wish to
become or to remain members of the religious group to which the nar-
43. See Garet, supra note 39, at 1045, 1046. See also Hafen, Developing Student Expres-
sion Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663,
671-72 (1987).
44. Garet, supra note 39, at 1052; accord A. MACINTYRLE, supra note 33, at 220, 221; W.
McDOUGALL, supra note 35, at 10-11.
45. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 222; Perry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 36, at 560-61; White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal
Life, 52 CHI. L. REv. 684, 693 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as Rhetoric]. See also White, Law as
Language, supra note 37, at 427.
46. W. MCDOUGALL, supra note 35, at 49, 62-63. See generally A. MACINTYRE, supra
note 33, at 206-07.
47. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 36, at 60; A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 206; Cover,
supra note 40, at 46.
48. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 206, 208, 216; S. HAUtRWAS, supra note 36, at
59, 60, 61; see generally Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. Rav. 373, 378 n.18 (1982).
49. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 215; Cover, supra note 40, at 9, 10; Perry,
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 36, at 558, 560.
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rative pertains. It is, therefore, an arbiter of disputes among members
of the group, as well as an authoritative normative guide for personal
decisions.
The manner in which a religious group interprets its narrative in
applying it to group disputes and decisions constitutes the internal law
by which the group governs and defines itself."0 Thus, such disputes
and decisions are political in a deeper sense than that term sometimes
suggests. Such conflicts are not just about power, but also about mean-
ing. 5 Narrative interpretations are the principal means by which a reli-
gious group communicates its core concerns to itself and to others.5 2
Narrative interpretation, however, cannot generate precise and
singular articulations of core religious group concerns. There usually
exists considerable uncertainty among the members of any group about
the defining characteristics of group membership. In particular, mem-
bers of religious groups often will disagree among themselves on their
group's core concerns. Many of the internal disputes that arise in reli-
gious groups can be characterized as disputes over narrative meaning:
whether or not a particular belief, experience, practice, or other charac-
teristic should or should not, might or must, be included as a core con-
cern of the group. One group faction may argue that a person must
believe or act in a particular way in order to become or to remain a
"real" or "true" member and to partake of the benefits of group mem-
bership. Another faction will respond that such beliefs and behavior are
unrelated or marginally related to the core concerns of the group. The
faction with the more potent narrative interpretation will have greater
internal power and therefore will eventually win the definitional strug-
gle.53 The losers in the group power struggle are then left with a narrow
choice. They must either reconcile themselves to the prevailing view or
withdraw voluntarily. Remaining in a religious group without recon-
ciling will likely lead to excommunication. 54
In many cases, once a group becomes a distinct and discernable
community, the relationship between core concerns and group mem-
bers is symbiotic. A group's core concerns largely determine who is ad-
50. See Anastaplo, Church and State: Explorations, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 120-21
(1987); Cover, supra note 40, at 4-5, 32; cf. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 36, at 56 ("for Christian
ethics, the Bible is not just a collection of texts but scripture that makes normative claims on a
community").
51. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 36, at 61, 62; Cover, supra note 40, at 16-18.
52. See generally W. MCDOUGALL, supra note 35, at 60.
53. See S. HAUERWAS, supra note 36, at 60-62. See generally White, Law as Rhetoric,
supra note 45, at 700-01 (discussing rhetoric as shared group language allowing debate and defini-
tion of core questions in community existence).
54. Cover, supra note 40, at 15-16. See generally R. NIEauR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND
POLITICAL PROBLEMS 125 (1953) (historically, formation of political communities has required the
imposition of political power even when strong magnets for community formation existed).
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mitted and retained as a member. 5 In turn, those who are admitted
and retained have a dynamic influence on the substantive content of the
group's core concerns.56 Once a group is established, neither the mem-
bers' personal values nor the core concerns of a group are prior to the
other.
Therefore, government action that purports to dictate whom a
group must accept as a member and whom it may reject is a significant
intrusion on the group. When government is permitted to pass on the
permissibility of using particular beliefs, experiences, or practices as in-
dicia for group membership, government possesses the power to desig-
nate the legitimate bases upon which groups may exist.5" Therefore,
government regulation of internal group conflicts may threaten a
group's existence.
For example, if the preliminary findings of the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission had been finalized and upheld in Dayton Christian
Schools,5" the state would have determined that no school can exist
within its jurisdiction to the extent that one of its core concerns entails
gender discrimination. If it had wished to continue its existence as a
private religious school, Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. would have
-been forced to place in question, if not totally abandon, its core belief
that women with preschool children should remain at home.
Paradoxically, a decision to conform to majoritarian values in
such a situation in order to ensure the survival of the community would
itself be a threat to such survival. Admittedly, the community of Day-
ton Christian Schools, Inc. could have continued to believe that women
with preschool children should stay home, even though the community
could not fully act on that belief. As the Supreme Court periodically
intones, freedom of belief is absolute, though freedom of action is
not.59 Nevertheless, the powerlessness of the school community to act
on its belief would have seriously undermined its efforts to teach the
55. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (regulations
requiring Jaycees to admit women "may impair the ability of the original members to express only
those views that brought them together" [that is, core concerns]).
56. See P. TILLICH, LOVE, POWER, AND JUSTICE 92-93 (1960); Perry, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, supra note 36, at 560.
57. See Religion and the State, supra note 39, at 1761:
[Clurrent judicial inquiries into the nature and existence of organizational belief threaten
organizational interests in autonomy. Regardless of whether an organization's claim is
based on the right of conscientious objection or on the right to autonomy, courts effec-
tively strip the church of its power to define group belief, and hence the church's ability to
determine its own development and membership.
See also Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. Rav. 1373, 1399 (1981).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
59. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion). See also
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
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importance of the belief to fundamentalist Christian living.6 ° If the be-
lief is not effectively transmitted to future generations, it will fade as a
core concern of the community. The community that remains after gov-
ernment intervention will eventually differ materially from the commu-
nity that predates the intervention. Although the earlier community re-
mains physically intact, in a very real sense it will have ceased to exist.
An example of this paradox is found in the federal government's
efforts to stamp out polygamy among the Mormons during the last cen-
tury. 61 Nineteenth-century Mormonism was one of the many innova-
tive and creative American religions that emerged from the second
Great Awakening. Federal persecution of the Mormons began in the
1850s and focused on the practice of Mormon men marrying and living
with two or more women at the same time. Polygamy had deep theolog-
ical roots in Mormon beliefs about the after-life.62 Belief in, and sup-
port of, the practice was perhaps the single most reliable indicator of
the faithfulness of nineteenth-century Mormons.
Attempting to coerce the Mormons into abandoning polygamy,
various Presidents dispatched federal troops to occupy the Utah Terri-
tory. Congress passed legislation which suspended civil and common
law rights of Mormons, including the spousal privilege against testi-
mony and the rights to vote and to serve on juries. Congress provided
for the prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of hundreds of Mor-
mon men. Congress also refused to admit Utah into the Union as a
state. 63 Finally, in 1890, the Supreme Court upheld earlier legislation
which revoked the legal charter of the Mormon church and provided
for the forfeiture of virtually all of its property to the federal govern-
ment.64 One year later, on the brink of financial ruin and legal oblivion,
the Mormons capitulated and renounced polygamy. The Mormons
then undertook to convince Congress that they were enough like other
Americans that Utah could safely be admitted as a state.65 Thus, Mor-
monism abandoned a central tenet of its faith and reoriented itself to
60. See, e.g., Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 319 (5th Cir. 1977)
(en banc) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
61. See generally L. ARRINGTON & D. BiTTON, THE MORMON ExPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF
THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 185-240 (1979).
62. See, e.g., DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS § 132:28-39 (1981) [hereinafter DOCTRINE AND COVENArs].
63. See, e.g., Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862); Poland Act, ch. 469,
18 Stat. pt. 3 at 253 (1874); Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882). See also Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding Idaho territorial law prohibiting Mormons from voting, serving as
jurors, or holding public office). See generally Driggs, The Mormon Church-State Confrontation in
Nineteenth-Century America, J. CHURCH & ST. 273 (1988); Driggs, The Prosecutions Begin: Defin-
ing Cohabitation in 1885, 21 DIALOGUE: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT 109 (Spring 1988).
64. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act).
65. See generally L. ARRINGTON & D. BirrON, supra note 61, at 230, 244-46.
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conventional morality as the price of survival. A century later, Mor-
monism is known for its deference to secular authority, while its origins
in theological experimentation have faded. In many respects, contem-
porary Mormonism bears little resemblance to the independent pioneer
society from which it descended.6 6
Thus, there are two dimensions to the threat to group existence
that inheres in government regulation of group membership: Whether
the group will remain physically intact and, if so, what kind of group it
will be. The group that refuses to change a core concern to comply with
valid regulation may be liquidated and cease physically and legally to
exist. The group that chooses to abandon a core concern in order to
comply with regulation alters its definitional boundaries, thereby trans-
forming itself into a different group.67 In either event, the group has
ceased to be, having been extinguished by the government's regulatory
intervention.68
This problem was present in Amos, as well as in Dayton Christian
Schools, though in subtler form, because Amos did not entail employ-
ment in an activity as obviously religious as that of the teacher in Day-
ton Christian Schools. The district court in Amos found that the Deseret
Gym where the plaintiff worked was indistinguishable from health
clubs and similar facilities operated by secular individuals and entities
for profit, and that the plaintiff's specific duties at the gym were unques-
tionably secular.69 Thus, in the court's view, core religious group con-
cerns were not even implicated in the question whether the plaintiff
should continue to work at the gym.
The district court opinion ignored the wide variety of ways in
which the Mormon church's actions in dismissing the employee fit
within the narratives and theology of the Mormon religion.7 ° The
church articulated a variety of reasons why it found it theologically im-
66. For another example, see Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. BAR
FOUND. RFs. J. I,, which chronicles the use of American law and legal institutions as tools of
cultural oppression against Native Americans. See generally Mauss, Assimilation and Ambiva-
lence: The Mormon Reaction to Americanization, 22 DIALOGUE: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT
30 (Spring 1989).
67. Cf. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A "Naturalist"
Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 995, 1034 (1986) [hereinafter Perry, A Naturalist Perspective] ("the
identity of a tradition is ... largely constituted by its fundamental beliefs. To revise any of those
beliefs is, to that extent, to revise the tradition.").
68. See Cover, supra note 40, at 40-44; Religion and the State, supra note 39, at 1753.
69. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 802.
70. For example, the gym represents a tangible expression by the church, backed by a
significant commitment of resources, that proper physical health and exercise are integrally bound
up with the ideal Mormon lifestyle. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336 n.14; 594 F. Supp. at 800-01 n.15.
Therefore, by refusing to allow the church to employ only firmly committed Mormons to operate
the gym, the district court significantly interfered in the church's mode of expressing one aspect of
the Mormon faith. Cf Braiterman & Kelley, When is Government Intervention Legitimate?, in
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, supra note 14, at 170, 190 ("How a religious body raises, invests and
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portant to employ only committed members in its nonprofit activi-
ties. 7 Perhaps the most telling point involved the source of the funds
that were used to pay the Amos employee's salary.
[S]ome of the money used to pay the salaries of [the Deseret
Gym] employees comes directly from contributions by mem-
bers of the Mormon Church. In spite of church policy, the
district court has ordered the church to use its monies to pay
salaries of those who do not meet its standards.72
Mormons understand and interpret the story of their founding as
one of extraordinary personal sacrifice by early members in the face of
violent persecution. Contemporary Mormons see the founding genera-
tions as having been willing to sacrifice their material possessions, their
families, and even their lives, because of their belief that by doing so
they were serving their church and their God.73
Contemporary Mormons continue to see their religion as a de-
manding one. One belief that is perceived as particularly difficult is the
payment of tithing. This requires Mormons to donate ten percent of
their annual income to the church in order to become and to remain
temple-worthy. In the eyes of the church, to use tithing donations to
support the economic livelihood of an unfaithful Mormon would dis-
honor both the sacrifice of those who pay tithing and the memory of the
sacrifices of their pioneer forebears.74
expends its funds cannot be divorced from its religious purpose, ministry and mission, and govern-
ment cannot intervene in one without affecting the other.").
71. In its brief, the church stated:
First, the Church believes that people judge it by the actions and attitudes of its employ-
ees. The "fact that an individual is employed by the Church signifies to others that his
actions are condoned by the Church." The Church also believes that "[a]ctive members
of the Church ... better understand and are more effective in carrying out the programs
and purposes of the Church." Moreover, salaries paid to Church employees are obtained
primarily from contributions from members of the Church donated to support Church
activities. The Church believes that it should benefit members with employment possibili-
ties in which these contributed funds are expended.
[E]mployment of the Church's own members is also consistent with the Church's
doctrine of individual self-sufficiency.
Brief for Appellants at 4-5, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (quoting district court record) (citations
omitted).
72. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). See also id. at 4.
73. Because the importance of the pioneer experience is more religious than historical,
Mormons tend to describe the accomplishments of the pioneers in uncritical, laudatory language.
See, e.g., 7 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 250-51 (Intro. by B. Roberts, 1974); True to the Faith, in
HYMNS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LA'ER-DAY SAINTs 254 (1st ed. 1985). For critical
examinations of the Mormon pioneer experience, see L. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830-1900 (1958); L. ARRINGTON & D. BtTrON,
supra note 61; W. STEGNER, THE GATHERING OF ZION: THE STORY OF THE MORMON TRAIL (1981).
74. The payment of tithing is typically invoked by Mormon leaders as a litmus test of
faithfulness to the church. See, e.g., JOSEPH F. SMITH, GOSPEL DOCTRINE 315-16, 324-27 (1938);
Ballard, Sacrifice and Self-Sufficiency, THE ENSIGN, Nov. 1987, at 78; Kimball, The Law of Tithing,
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Forcing the Mormon church to retain an unfaithful employee and
to pay his salary with tithing funds would have undermined the sacrifice
narrative that is so prominent both in Mormon history and in contem-
porary Mormon life. If the church community sought to reinterpret this
narrative to accommodate the use of tithing to benefit the unfaithful, it
would be forced to dilute and perhaps even to abandon the powerful
concept that tithing is the sacred means by which Mormons build the
Kingdom of God. The church's vision of itself as a people of sacrifice
would fade into one of a people of prudence.
That the Mormon church might itself choose prudence over sacri-
fice is not constitutionally significant. That it should be forced to do so
by the government is theological violence.75 A religious group values
not only its narratives and theology, but also the authority to interpret
and to change its narratives and theology. Without this authority, a
religious tradition stagnates into irrelevance. The narratives of a reli-
gious group demonstrate that the group has a past, but it is the group's
institutional authority to interpret and reinterpret its past that gives the
group a future.
When the government coerces a group to accept or to retain as a
member a person whom the group would otherwise reject or expel, it
blindly enters the religious domain. It arrogates to itself the power to
define the boundaries of group membership-the greatest intrusion
that the government can perpetrate against a group.76 The group loses
the authority to define and to control the terms of its own existence. In a
very real sense, the group ceases to exist. The group's vision of itself, its
ability freely to tell and retell its narrative story, is destroyed by the
insistence on conformity to majoritarian values.77
THE ENSIGN, Nov. 1980, at 77. Mormon theology ties the payment of tithing by Mormons directly
to the sacrifices of the pioneers. See, e.g., DOCTRINE AND COVENANrs, supra note 62, § 119: 5-6:
Verily I say unto you, it shall come to pass that all those who gather unto the land
of Zion shall be tithed of their surplus properties, and shall observe this law, or they shall
not be found worthy to abide among you.
And I say unto you, if my people observe not this law, to keep it holy, and by this
law sanctify the land of Zion unto me, that my statutes and my judgments may be kept
thereon, that it may be most holy, behold, verily I say unto you, it shall not be a land of
Zion unto you.
75. See Cover, supra note 40, at 44.
76. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984); Linder, Freedom of
Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1881, 1902 (1984).
77. See R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 142 (1984) ("When an institution that is voluntary in membership cannot define the
conditions of belonging, that institution in fact ceases to exist."); Laycock, supra note 57, at 1391
("[W]hen the state interferes with the autonomy of a church, and particularly when it interferes
with the allocation of authority and influences within a church, it interferes with the very process
of forming the religion as it will exist in the future."). See generally Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 339 (1986) [hereinafter Karst, Cultural
Identity] ("Some constitutional recognition is also given to a cultural group's right to exclude
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Accordingly, government intervention in religious group conflicts
about membership threatens a vigorous and meaningful religious plu-
ralism by restricting the number and diversity of groups. If carried to its
ultimate conclusion, such intervention permits only religious groups
whose core concerns do not differ materially from values held by the
majority.7 8 The social and individual values to be derived from plural-
ism are lost.
III. THE PARADOX OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN MODERN AMERICA
Groups are important to individuals and to society for a variety of
reasons. They protect individual freedom, they provide supportive con-
texts for the development of individuality, and they are a source of val-
ues for self-government. In the United States, religious groups have his-
torically performed each of these functions, and are especially
important because of the continuing commitment of large numbers of
Americans to religious traditions.79 Yet, the contributions of groups to
society and to individuality entail their own costs. When these costs are
considered in light of the theoretical and sociological biases against reli-
gion that inhere in liberal political theory and in contemporary public
life, the positive contributions of religious groups to society and to indi-
viduals often are overlooked.
A. Groups and the Liberal State
The pluralism thesis prevalent in American political thought posits
a large and diverse number of non-governmental groups interposed be-
tween the government and the individual as the best means of preserv-
ing individual autonomy.80 According to conventional pluralist wis-
dom, these groups serve to insulate the otherwise powerless individual
against the bureaucracy and coercion of the powerful modern state. 8'
outsiders in order to maintain its own integrity."); Perry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note
36, at 560 (describing how a community creates its traditions by interpreting its authoritative texts
according to the demands of its own experiences).
78. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring):
[Tlroubling to me is the element of conformity that appears to inform the Court's analy-
sis. The Court asserts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably serve and be in
harmony with the public interest," must have a purpose that comports with "the com-
mon community conscience," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds with
[the] declared position of the whole Government."
79. See supra notes 1 & 3 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619, 622 (1984); Marshall,
supra note 35, at 87-88.
81.' See Frug, supra note 33, at 1121-22; e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1297 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw].
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For example, the political role played by the Roman Catholic church in
the Philippines and Poland dramatically demonstrates the extent to
which a strong and assertive group can protect individual autonomy
and identity from the repression of authoritarian and even totalitarian
regimes.8 2
Groups also provide contexts for personal expression, develop-
ment, and fulfillment.8 3 An individual's definition and sense of self de-
pends to a significant extent on the character of the recognition granted
by others.4 Thus, the groups to which an individual belongs are a sig-
nificant influence on the development of personality, as well as a source
of loyalty and solidarity.8 5
Finally, groups are sources of moral values and as such make a
critical contribution to the democratic process. In liberal society, the
government has no competence to determine moral ends.8 6 In theory,
at least, the goals of liberal democratic government must depend on the
moral values held by those that it governs-values that originate
outside of government in churches, families, political parties, trade un-
ions, private schools, and other voluntary associations.8 7 In the ab-
sence of these groups, government and society would be deprived of the
enriching moral world-views that these groups contribute to American
culture and politics.
8 8
The existence of groups, however, is not an unqualified benefit to
individuals or to society. Socially deviant group behavior threatens po-
82. It is widely recognized that the institutional support and protection offered by the
Catholic church to political dissenters in these countries have shielded them from much state retal-
iation. See, e.g., R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 88; Diehl, Church Schools Thrive in Poland: Chil-
dren and Adults Learn -How to Challenge Party Line, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1986, at Al, col. 1;
Moody, God and Man in Manila, TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 31; Zelenko, The Catholic Church Is in the
Middle, 18 NAT'L J. 2889 (1986). See also Hughes, Poland's Upheaval, Christian Sci. Monitor, May
4, 1988, at 14; Mydans, Bacolod Journal: Priests Are Targets As They Stand Up for Change, N.Y.
Times, May 23, 1987, § I, at 4, col. I.
83. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 92; Linder, supra note 76, at 1901; Note, Reinter-
preting the Religious Clauses, supra note 38, at 1473. See also A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 218;
R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46-49 (1985).
84. H. GUNTRIP, PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, THERAPY, AND THE SELF 39-49, 95-109
(1971); A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 33, 58; Karst, Cultural Identity, supra note 77, at 307-09.
85. E.g., R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 55-56; see E. ERIKSON, supra note 38, at 277-78;
Note, Reinterpreting the Religious Clauses, supra note 38, at 1473. For a general discussion of the
influence of groups on the development of personality, see Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Auton-
omy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579,
1600-02 (1987).
86. See generally R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN
TIME OF TRIAL 152 (1975); and infra text accompanying notes 261-64.
87. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 21, 60, 136; see infra notes 292-95 and accompanying
text.
88. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 157; TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at
1418-19.
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litical and social stability.8 9 Group solidarity may encourage individual
defiance of law.9" Moreover, the government may amend or repeal a
disputed law when confronted with significant civil defiance, even if
most citizens obey the law. Thus, when a group challenges governmen-
tal power to regulate its actions, it sows the seeds of lawlessness and
instability. This is particularly troubling when the source of the govern-
ment's power is majoritarian consensus. The group challenge may
amount to the dictation or repeal of general law by a numerical
minority.
Groups, moreover, are capable of imposing their own forms of
repression on individuals. Though groups protect individual autonomy
by challenging otherwise unmitigated governmental power, they also
erode such autonomy by the manner in which they admit, control, and
expel their members.9 1 The core concerns that delineate the boundaries
of group membership exclude from the benefits of group membership
those who do not conform. Even those who consider themselves mem-
bers of a group may find themselves expelled or ostracized because of
failure to adhere to the group orthodoxy of beliefs and practices. The
very church that champions individual freedom in the Philippines and
Poland also is criticized for the unmodern restrictions that it imposes on
its members with respect to abortion, birth control, divorce, pre-marital
sex, and other aspects of contemporary life.92 Because a significant por-
tion of an individual's personality and identity often is tied to identifica-
tion and interaction with a group, the threat of expulsion or disap-
proval from the group understandably exerts significant coercive
pressure on individual choice.93
Thus, the individual autonomy that is enhanced by a vigorous
group pluralism comes at the cost of threats to governmental stability
and to the autonomy of those who do not conform to the norms of
politically and socially important groups. 94 Accordingly, individuals
experience increased freedom in a pluralistic society only to the extent
89. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1297 (noting that some take the
position that "intermediate associations... weaken public authority .. "); Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. RE. 983, 986 (1963) [here-
inafter Judicial Control of Private Associations] ("private associations ... compet[e] with the state
and other groups for individual loyalties .. "). See also Cover, supra note 40, at 46; Howe, The
Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L.
Rav. 91, 91 (1953); Garet, supra note 39, at 1010.
90. See generally R. SMiTH, supra note 83, at 188 (quoting & paraphrasing J. RAwis, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 441-42, 450, 536, 544 (1971)).
91. Garet, supra note 39, at 1010, 1022, 1030-31, 1046-47. See generally TRIBE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1297; Emerson, supra note 36, at 950-52.
92. See generally R. NEuHAUs, supra note 77, at 45.
93. See Note, Reinterpreting the Religious Clauses, supra note 38, at 1474.
94. Frug, supra note 33, at 1122; Garet, supra note 39, at 1052; Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. Rav. 205, 211 -12 (1979).
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that their individuality is consistent with the behavioral norms dictated
by the group or groups to which they belong or with which they other-
wise identify themselves.
Despite their negative attributes, groups are a social necessity.95
Some of our most cherished individual rights have their roots in group
action. 96 Even group restrictions on individual freedom in the short run
may be designed to enhance freedom in the long run. Many religious
groups believe that the achievement of genuine human happiness lies in
a life lived in conformity to certain demanding standards of personal
belief and conduct. Thus, what may appear to be group coercion of
individual choice may in actuality be the choice to find personal fulfill-
ment in the manner that seems best to the individual. An individual's
right to do this, of course, lies at the very heart of liberalism. For these
reasons, even liberals agree that the continued existence of a large
number of diverse and vigorous non-governmental groups in American
society is valuable for safeguarding and enhancing individual
autonomy. 9
7
Consistent vindication of individual rights or government interests
against group claims would eventually end in the elimination of socially
idiosyncratic groups. The only groups left would be those that espouse
beliefs and standards of conduct consistent with the individual rights
and societal interests established by the majority. Obviously, individual
autonomy is neither protected nor enhanced by a "pluralism" that only
parrots the party line. In those cases in which the vindication of an
individual right or societal interest would threaten the integrity, and
thus the continued existence, of a group, the appropriate constitutional
result is not self-evident.9" The critical issue will always be how to pro-
95. Some have described this as the fundamental contradiction of modern life. E.g.,
Kennedy, supra note 94, at 211-12. See also Frug, supra note 33, at 1145; Macneil, Bureaucracy,
Liberalism, and Community--American Style, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 900, 900 n.5 (1985). For a crea-
tive exploration of this contradiction in the context of a religious group, see Pepper, The Case of
the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIZ. L. RE. 897 (1981).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 76, at 1887
("[Neither political parties nor organized religion could flourish without association."). See gener-
ally Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note 89, at 987-90.
97. See Macneil, supra note 95, at 945:
While in liberal theory the community value is anti-individualistic, it has always been
recognized in liberal practice that protection of individualistic rights, whether against
other individuals acting alone or in collectivities up to and including the state, can often
be achieved only through communities other than the state itself.
(emphasis in original).
98. See Garet, supra note 39, at 1052-53:
If it happens that the granting of the group claim also satisfies the claims of individuality
or personhood, this is not due to the production of individuality by groups, but to the
ultimate common grounding of both individuality and groupness (and sociality) in the
structure of the human. If it happens instead that the granting of the group claim ob-
structs the claims of individuality, then the tragedy is not a choice between immediate
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tect important governmental interests and individual rights while still
permitting a meaningful plurality of groups.
Unfortunately, liberalism generally ignores the social role of
groups, and many of its theoretical variations simply leave groups un-
accounted for.99 The uncompromising duality of individual and state
that is embodied in liberal political theory presupposes that these are
the only relevant actors on the social and political stage. 100 In the
American legal system, then, lawmakers, judges, and litigants are
driven to characterize the claims of groups in terms of either individual
rights or government interests. 10 1 Group claims are transformed into
aggregations of individual rights or embodiments of government
interests. 102
However, many groups reject the more widely accepted and pro-
tected of individual rights and government interests, such as racial and
sexual equality and procreational freedom. Many more groups that ac-
cept the legitimacy of such rights and interests nevertheless differ on
their precise meaning, content, and importance.10 3 If, as is often the
case, the different values and interests reflected in group claims cannot
be captured fully by a translation into the language of individual rights
or government interests, those values and interests will be overlooked
and even threatened by constitutional law.' 04
and deferred (or specific and general) individuality, but rather a choice between distinct
elements of the human good.
99. R. SMITr, supra note 83, at 46-49; see, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAiRS 107, 171-72 (individual rights theories cannot account for the
constitutional imperative of affirmative action).
100. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 34, 35; Garet, supra note 39, at 1013-14; see Ken-
nedy, supra note 94, at 217; Linder, supra note 76, at 1881-82.
101. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 95, at 946 ("the community value [currently is] dis-
guised in such individualistic forms as individual liberty, the right of privacy, and property
rights").
102. See id. at 913.
103. See generally Hafen, Institutional Autonomy in Public, Private, and Church-Related
Schools, 3 NoTRE DAME J.L., ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 405, 417, 419-22 (1988).
104. Garet, supra note 39, at 1012:
[Tmhe jurisprudence of constitutional rights [presupposes] that those rights must be indi-
vidual rights, not group rights .... [I]ndividual and social values [are] the norms that
animate constitutional rights .... [G]roups [are] outside of the ambit of those values.
Rights are concerns for individuals and for society, rather than concerns for groups....
[Individual and social values [also] account for governmental power to regulate and
control groups. Thus, groups are doubly vulnerable; they are especially important
targets of governmental regulation, and they are conspicuously missing from the cover-
age of fundamental rights.
See also id. at 1015, 1049.
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B. Religion, Liberalism, and Modernism.
The rather uncertain protection accorded to groups by the liberal
state becomes more precarious when the groups are religious. This is
partly the legacy of the early liberal theorists. The early liberals were
highly suspicious of collective action in general.1 °5 Having been trau-
matized by the religious violence of the post-Reformation wars, they
remained deeply suspicious of the politically destabilizing potential of
collective religious action in particular.'0 6 Locke, for example, sought
to make religious values purely private matters of conscience. He fur-
ther argued that reason alone was the measure of the validity of reli-
gious revelation.107 This suspicion of the religious collective was shared
by many of the American founders, in particular Madison and Jeffer-
son, who exhibited a persistent concern with the problem of religious
strife. 108
As American society modernized and became technologically so-
phisticated, the influence of religious institutions and organizations in
American public culture declined, turning the American cultural elite
away from religious ways of understanding reality.' 0 9 Currently, some
of our most powerful and influential cultural organs, such as public
education, the national print, and the electronic media, often fail to
acknowledge the considerable social and cultural relevance of religious
institutions and religious individuals." 0 The resurgence of both liberal
and conservative religion into politics during the last generation contin-
ues to be the subject of heated and polemical debate."' Many believe
that religion is only the private concern of individuals and is dangerous
and threatening when manifested in public life.' 12
105. Id. at 1010, 1062; Howe, supra note 89, at 91-92.
106. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 8, 156; R. SMITH, supra note 83, at 3, 18 passim.
107. R. SMITH, supra note 83, at 20-21, 38 (discussing J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 43, 45, 688-96 (P. Nidditch ed. 1975)).
108. R. SMITH, supra note 83, at 19. See also Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations
in Contemporary American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371, 383, 386-87.
109. Roger Hendrix and I have discussed and criticized this phenomenon at length in
Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 85, at 1582-94, 1603-10. See also Anastaplo, supra note 50, at I I I-
12.
110. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 85, at 1580-82 & nn. 7-10 & 13-14.
111. See, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, HOLY TERROR: THE FUNDAMENTALIST WAR ON
AMERICA'S FREEDOMS IN RELIGION, POLITICS AND OUR PRIVATE LIVES (1982); G. EVANS & C.
SINGER, THE CHURCH AND THE SWORD: How THE CHURCHES AND PEACE MOVEMENT ARE STORMING
AMERICA-AND WHAT YOU CAN Do ABOUT IT (rev. ed. 1983).
112. See Kelley, supra note 14, at 3:
There was a time not long ago when many people used the phrase "Separation of Church
and State" to mean "Stop the Catholic Church." Some still use the phrase to mean
"Keep (all) the churches in their place," and that "place" is thought by them to be the
sanctuary, the cloister, and the sacristy.
See also Anastaplo, supra note 50, at 106-07; Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 70, at 189.
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These attributes of American history and culture have had their
effect on the Supreme Court's attitude toward religious groups. The
constitutional law of religious freedom usually focuses on religious be-
liefs as private matters of conscience. 113 Analysis of religion clause is-
sues against the backdrop of contemporary individual-rights-oriented
constitutional jurisprudence understandably sharpens the focus on reli-
gion as an aspect of personal privacy rather than public community. 1" 4
Accordingly, when the Court acts under the first amendment to
protect the private religious conduct of individuals, it refers explicitly to
freedom of religious conscience as a justification." 5 In contrast, when
the Court passes on manifestations of public religion, it often protects
religion by reference to a non-religious justification." 6 In other words,
religion in this latter context is not protected as religion, but as more
generalized speech and expression. At times, the Court is at pains to
persuade that what clearly seems to be religion is really not, religion at
all or, at least, is barely so.' 1' Religion is consistently protected under
113. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694-95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Berman, Religion and
Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMoRY L.J. 777, 789 (1986).
114. See Kelley, supra note 14, at 9:
[T]he civil libertarian's solicitude for religious liberty is made uneasy if two or more per-
sons gathered together seek to exercise their religious liberty in concert, and if they do so
as a church, the civil libertarian becomes positively apprehensive and his or her solicita-
tion for the "free exercise of religion" tends to be replaced by intense anxieties about
"establishment." Thus the collective free exercise of religion by believers joined together
in organization has enjoyed a somewhat more limited recognition in American church
and state law and a distinctly suspicious reception in less reflective circles.
(emphasis in original).
See also Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988
DUKE L.J. 685, 701-04 (discussing historical trend in Western culture away from communitarian
norms and toward individual norms).
115. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert.v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1966). But see Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
116. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free
Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. Rav. 545 (1983).
117. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983). See also R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 80:
[The [Supreme] Court's references to religion [have] had less and less to do with what is
usually meant by religion. That is, religion no longer refers to those communal traditions
of ultimate beliefs and practices ordinarily called religion. Religion, in the court's mean-
ing, became radically individualized and privatized .... Thus religion is no longer a
matter of content but of sincerity. It is no longer a matter of communal values but of
individual conviction. In short, it is no longer a public reality and therefore cannot inter-
fere with public business.
See generally Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A Privatization Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30
ST. Louis U. L.J. 275 (1986); Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 739 (1986); Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution,
1983 SuP. CT. RV. 83.
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the first amendment as religion only when it is private. Public religion is
also protected, but to a lesser degree and often only when it can be
characterized as something else.
In sum, religious groups suffer from a dual disability when they
seek constitutional protection from regulation by the modem liberal
state. First, groups in general threaten governmental stability and exert
coercive pressure on the autonomy of members whose individuality is
not fully consistent with group norms. The threat to both stability and
autonomy strikes at the foundation of liberal political theory. Second,
religious groups seek this protection in the context of a modern scien-
tific society that generally does not value the transcendent world views
and intuitive knowledge of reality that are offered by religion."' This
dual disability exerts pressure in the direction of less constitutional pro-
tection for the interests of religious groups than for those of individuals
or government.
IV. RELIGIOUS GROUP PROTECTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Despite the dominance of individual rights theories in American
constitutional law, the first amendment freedom of association affords
some protection against government intrusion on the membership deci-
sions of religious groups. Certain Supreme Court decisions under the
religion clauses have also granted a measure of constitutional protec-
tion to religious groups. However, neither associational freedom nor
free exercise currently offer religious groups a constitutional shelter that
is sufficiently broad to cover the religious group's interest in self-
definition.
A. Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression
1. INSTRUMENTAL ASSOCIATION
The constitutional freedom of association was originally conceived
of instrumentally, as an ancillary right necessary to make the dominant
first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press both
possible and meaningful.' 19 The right to associate for political advo-
cacy, litigation, or religious proselytizing is constitutionally protected
118. This second disability is exacerbated by the establishment clause, which generally
prohibits government from advocating or promoting religious beliefs or experiences. Strict inter-
pretations of the clause suggest that government should be prohibited from being associated or
identified with even generalized religious beliefs or experiences. See generally Gedicks, Motivation,
Rationality, and Secular Purpose in Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677.
119. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that free-
dom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
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because group action is necessary in order to make one's views heard in
the mythical marketplace of ideas.' 20
Freedom of association has been held to encompass the right of
group members to define the criteria of group membership, because the
selection of members will influence the content of the expression ad-
vanced by the group. 2 ' Thus, freedom of association also must imply a
freedom of disassociation, which grants to individuals not only the
right to engage in group action to advance particular ideas, but also the
right to disassociate themselves and the group from ideas that they find
repugnant. 12
2
Those religious groups for whom advocacy of certain religious ide-
als or ways of life is a defining characteristic of membership are well
protected by instrumental freedom of association. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., for example, exists to provide primary and secondary ed-
ucation in a fundamentalist Christian context. 1 23 More specifically,
those associated with the school intend that it act as a powerful vehicle
for transferring and inculcating fundamentalist values to and in the
children who attend the school. 124 For precisely that reason, the school
employs teachers who are capable not only of effectively teaching secu-
lar subjects, but who also can integrate the teaching of those subjects
with fundamentalist values.' 25 It follows that teachers at the school
must themselves exemplify the fundamentalist lifestyle. Because one of
the values espoused by the school is that women with young children
should not work outside their homes, instrumental freedom of associa-
tion provides a powerful justification, apart from free exercise of reli-
gion, for permitting the school to discriminate against working women
with small children. Forcing the school to hire such women, or to retain
them as employees, drastically interferes with the school's advocacy
function; it prevents the school from disassociating itself from a social
practice that it finds worldly and sinful, and from effectively conveying
the fundamentalist alternative as a realistic way of life.
freedom of speech."); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984);
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1013-14; Marshall, supra note 35, at 80.
120. E.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958); see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429-31 (1963); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
121. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 420 (upholding NAACP rule
that members of its legal staff must agree to abide by policies that delineate the kinds of litigation
the NAACP will assist).
122. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35; see West Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634, 642; id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
123. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 766 F.2d 932, 936 (6th Cir.
1985).
124. Id. at 936-37.
125. Id.
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In Amos, on the other hand, although the Deseret Gym can be
described as an aspirational expression of the importance of physical
health and exercise to the Mormon faith, 26 it nevertheless is a consid-
erable stretch to argue that the gym's principal purpose is to "advo-
cate" physical health and well-being in the first amendment sense. The
gym does not have a political, proselytizing, or teaching function, and it
is not connected in any way to expressive litigation. Even if one is per-
suaded that the gym does constitute first amendment advocacy, it is
difficult to discern how that advocacy is disrupted when the custodial
supervisor is not a temple-worthy Mormon. Almost none of the ethical
and behavioral standards that a Mormon must adhere to in order to
participate in temple worship have anything to do with physical
health."'2 So long as an employee's religious and other beliefs and con-
duct are not obviously inconsistent with good health and proper exer-
cise, it would seem that advocacy of such goals is unaffected even if the
employee is not a Mormon at all.
The difficulty in Amos is that a religious group advocates its histor-
ical and theological narratives, if at all, only in its proselytizing mode.
Clearly, if the plaintiff had been a missionary or an employee directly
involved in the Church's missionary effort, instrumental association
would have provided a constitutional justification for termination.
Without such a connection to proselytizing, however, instrumental as-
sociation generally has no protection to offer religious groups. The facts
of Amos, therefore, illustrate how the spiritual beliefs of a religious
community may be seriously disrupted without triggering the constitu-
tional protections of instrumental association.' 28
Under this instrumental analysis, a religious group right to auton-
omy in choosing members is not an independent constitutional good.
The group interest in self-definition is protected by the instrumental
mode of freedom of association only to the extent that a governmen-
tally coerced change would alter ideas that the group advocates in the
first amendment marketplace. 29 Thus, religious groups that are not
centrally concerned with advocacy, or whose advocacy is not obviously
126. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
127. The only health-related standard is compliance with the "Word of Wisdom," which
Mormons narrowly interpret in this context as requiring abstention from the consumption or use
of coffee, tea, alcohol, tobacco, or illicit drugs. See, e.g., B. MCCONKIE, MORMON DOCTRINE 845
(2d ed. 1966) (interpreting DocTmINE AND COVENANTS, supra note 62, § 89).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
129. For this reason the Jaycees group in Roberts tried to portray itself as significantly
involved in first amendment advocacy based on its filing of amicus briefs and otherwise participat-
ing in litigation that it deemed important. The Court, however, found that this expression was only
peripheral to the core concerns of the Jaycees and therefore held that the group was not an expres-
sive association entitled to constitutional protection. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
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affected by government regulation, are not protected. 1 30 As Professor
Tribe has suggested, one should not look to instrumental association
for substantial protection of the self-definitional interest of religious
groups. 131
2. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Not long after its initial explication of the freedom of association
doctrine, the Supreme Court discovered the constitutional right of pri-
vacy in the shadows of the Bill of Rights.1 32 This right has come to
mean that certain decisions and actions relating to one's sexual and
family relationships are insulated from governmental scrutiny unless
exceptional circumstances exist. Thus, the government cannot interfere
in a woman's right to choose abortion over childbirth until the fetus
reaches viability.' 33 Likewise, the government cannot interfere in one's
decisions about whom to marry, 134 whether to use contraceptives,1
3 5
whether to live as an extended family,' 36 or how to educate one's chil-
dren,' 37 unless some extraordinarily important government goal that
otherwise could not be effectuated is demonstrated.
The idea that animates the privacy cases is not one of instrumen-
talism, by which privacy would be only a right ancillary to the exercise
of other constitutional rights. Rather, the idea animating the privacy
cases is respect for the right to privacy as an end in itself. ' 31 Privacy is a
130. Although the cases rarely speak in terms of associational freedom, lower courts gen-
erally have assumed that religious groups are not constitutionally entitled to relief from generally
applicable law unless the law adversely impacts their religious teaching or proselytizing functions.
See, e.g., Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1 st Cir. 1985), vacated
on reh'g en banc, 793 F.2d 398, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying by equally divided court enforce-
ment of NLRB order), incorporated by reference into dissent from denial of enforcement, 793 F.2d
403, 403 (1st Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Salvation Army of Mass. Dorchester Day Care, 763 F.2d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 1985); King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996
(1974).
131. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 701, observes that believers in the
pluralistic thesis "will find little comfort in the freedom of association as it has evolved under the
umbrella of the First Amendment." Amos illustrates that freedom of association in its instrumen-
tal mode protects religious groups from government intrusion into their membership decisions
only when the group members plausibly can be characterized as exercising independently pro-
tected constitutional rights of speech and expression.
132. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978).
135. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
136. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
137. See, e.g., Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
138. Kenneth Karst and others see the right to privacy as a commitment by the Supreme
Court to the sanctity of individual autonomy and personhood as a general principle of constitu-
tional law. Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) [hereinafter Karst,
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constitutional right, not because the exercise of other constitutional
rights is impossible or meaningless without it, but rather because auton-
omy and kinship are impossible or meaningless without it."' The pri-
vacy cases recognize that there are certain foundational human rela-
tionships that are irreducible structures of existence.14 ° Modern life
without these relationships would be unimaginable,' 4 ' and the rela-
tionships themselves cannot coherently be subdivided into constituent
parts any more than one could subdivide a human being.I4 2 It follows
that participants in these foundational relationships are generally enti-
tled to order the relationships as they see fit without governmental in-
trusion, even when the choices made or conditions imposed on each
Intimate Association]; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A
Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1980). Others, however, see privacy as equally
concerned with protecting marriage and kinship as indispensable structures of Western society.
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individ-
ual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, Marriage, Kinship, and
Privacy]. Bruce Hafen, for example, puts privacy among the liberties protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, rather than as an independent source of constitu-
tional protection. Id. at 520. The former commentators look to Justice Douglas's opinion in Gris-
wold for inspiration; the latter to Justice Harlan's concurrence. Compare Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479
(opinion by Douglas, J.) with id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring), incorporating by reference Poe v.
UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); Thornburgh v.
American Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771-72 (1986).
140. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 (plurality opinion) ("the Constitution protects
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in our
nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of
our most cherished values, moral and cultural."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.");
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-1l (1888) ("[Marriage] is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there could be neither civilization nor progress."). See also Hafen, Mar-
riage, Kinship, and Privacy, supra note 138, at 569-72; Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 138,
at 640.
141. The unthinkable prospect of life without protection from government intrusion into
marital sex is the source of much of the rhetorical force of the Griswold opinions. The majority
argued: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for tell tale
signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. Justice Goldberg in concurrence stated:
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right to privacy in
marriage, I cannot believe that it offers those fundamental rights no protection.... While
it may shock some of my Brethren that the Court today holds-that the Constitution
protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the
personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include [such] protection. ...
Id. at 495-97; see also Ullman, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ( "Of this whole 'private
realm of family life' [that is constitutionally protected] it is difficult to imagine what is more private
or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.").
142. Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 138, at 635, 640; cf. Hafen, Marriage, Kin-
ship, and Privacy, supra note 138, at 569 (quoting H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163 (Ist Am. ed. i870)
("the unit of an ancient society was the Family .... )).
Religious Group Rights
other are inconsistent and even repugnant to conventional morality. 14 3
Privacy in such relationships is a foundational constituent of both per-
sonhood and society, and thus protected by the Constitution. 144
Of course, one can argue with some force that association with
others is also a primal element of human existence. This was not, how-
ever, the rationale of the early association cases. Those cases saw free-
dom of association as a second order constitutional right, one dimen-
sion removed from existential questions of personhood. Though
freedom of association is necessary for full realization of freedom of
expression, it is expression, not association, that is presumed to be the
constitutive element of human existence. 145
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,146 the Supreme Court unified
the theoretical underpinnings of association and privacy. In addition to
reaffirming freedom of association in its traditional instrumental mode,
labeled "extrinsic association" in Roberts, the Court also identified pri-
vacy as a non-instrumental dimension to associational freedom.
[Blecause the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual
liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of cer-
tain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial mea-
sure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the state....
[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in
the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs. 1 47
Freedom of association in this mode, "intrinsic association," is a con-
stitutional good in and of itself, irrespective of whether it promotes or
protects the exercise of other constitutional rights. 148 Although the
Court cited almost exclusively to the constitutional privacy cases in
sketching the contours of intrinsic association, 149 perhaps the most sig-
nificant aspect of Roberts is its clear signal that more than sexual and
143. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206,210-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Karst, Intimate Asso-
ciation, supra note 138, at 627, 635. Bruce Hafen takes issue with such a broad articulation of the
right to privacy, arguing that many of the Supreme Court's privacy opinions actually protect
conventional morality, contrary appearances notwithstanding. Hafen, Marriage, Kinship, and Pri-
vacy, supra note 138, at 519-24. Similarly, William Marshall suggests that Bowers, which held that
homosexual relationships are not constitutionally protected, renders the existence of a broad right
to intimate association problematic. Marshall, supra note 35, at 81.
144. Numerous commentators have suggested that groups are a constitutive element of
human existence. See, e.g., Garet, supra note 39, at 1070; Macneil, supra note 95, at 934, 937;
Marshall, supra note 35, at 86. See also Cover, supra note 40, at 32 n.94.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 119-30. One commentator has argued that ex-
pression is itself only an instrumental freedom. See Emerson, supra note 36, at 907.
146. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
147. Id. at 618-19 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
148. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
149. See id. at 618-19.
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family relationships may be constitutionally protected as intrinsic as-
sociations."' After Roberts, groups constitutionally unprotected
under the instrumental association cases might now be protected as in-
trinsic associations.
The determination whether a religious group constitutes extrinsic
or intrinsic association is critical, for it controls the extent to which the
group's self-definitional interest is protected. The core group concerns
of extrinsic associations are insulated from government attack only to
the extent that their alteration materially changes the character of any
expression that the group advocates in the marketplace of ideas.
Groups whose core concerns do not include the advocacy of ideas are
not constitutionally protected as extrinsic associations. Accordingly,
only expressive religious groups such as parochial schools and lobbying
groups are likely to be protected as extrinsic associations. By contrast,
the core group concerns of intrinsic associations are always protected
because of the existential, as opposed to instrumental, justification for
intrinsic association.
The Roberts Court articulated three factors that guide the determi-
nation whether a relationship is constitutionally protected as an intrin-
sic association: (1) a relatively small number of parties to the relation-
ship; (2) a high degree of selectivity in the organization and
maintenance of the relationship; and (3) the seclusion of the relation-
ship from others.' The Court went on to hold that the Jaycees was
not an intrinsic association because its local chapters are relatively
large, the benefits offered by membership are generally applicable busi-
ness skills, and membership criteria are unselective.' 52
In light of Roberts, religious groups will probably not receive sig-
nificant protection as intrinsic associations. Although denominational
American churches, for example, exercise religious selectivity in or-
ganizing and maintaining themselves, as well as in accepting and retain-
ing members, they are generally rather large, even at the grassroots par-
ish or congregational level. With isolated exceptions, these churches do
not exclude interested nonmembers from their worship services or most
other activities. Likewise, religious schools and colleges, though some-
times religiously selective in administration, admissions, and faculty,
are relatively large and very public in what they do. Indeed, one of the
ironies of Roberts is that the more open, flexible, and accepting a reli-
gious group is about the participation of nonmembers in its activities,
150. Id. at 620 (dictum). See also Marshall, supra note 35, at 80-81.
151. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
152. Id. at 621. See also Linder, supra note 76, at 1882, 1885, 1901.
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the less selective and secluded it becomes and the less likely it is to re-
ceive protection as an intrinsic association.1 53
Given the precedential roots of intrinsic association in cases in-
volving attempted government regulation of sexual and family relation-
ships, it would seem that religious groups of any size are simply not
what the Roberts Court had in mind.1 54 Accordingly, only those iso-
lated sub-relationships within religious groups that involve few people
and are both highly selective and generally private are likely to receive
any protection under the right of intrinsic association.
In sum, religious groups often will find themselves completely
outside the protection afforded by freedom of association because they
are neither extrinsic associations whose expressive concerns are
threatened by governmental regulation, nor intrinsic associations
whose intimacy is protected by the right to privacy. Indeed, one of the
unsettling lessons of Roberts is that a non-advocacy group that is pri-
vate in the sense that it is not a governmental actor and receives no
government funds or other assistance may nevertheless find itself un-
protected from government regulatory intrusion if it appeals to a public
constituency.
B. Free Exercise of Religion
Government and the courts are aware, and to some extent are even
sensitive, to the threats to religious pluralism that inhere in governmen-
tal regulation of religious groups. This is evident in both the nature of
that regulation and the development of constitutional protection for
religion under the free exercise clause. Legislative and judicial exemp-
153. E.g., Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 386 (1st Cir. 1985)
(university owned, controlled, and operated by Dominican order held not to be a religious opera-
tion because it imposed few religious standards on faculty, students, or administrators), vacated by
equally divided court on reh'g en banc, 793 F.2d 398, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Salvation
Army of Mass., 763 F.2d 1, 2, 5 (1st Cir. 1985) (church-owned preschool that admitted children
and hired staff without regard to creed, gave no religious instruction, and imposed no religious
conditions to employment, held not to be a religious operation despite church's belief that provid-
ing such services was a religious imperative); Denver Post of the Nat'l Soc'y of the Volunteers of
Am. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769, 773 (10th Cir. 1984) (religious group's programs not entitled to
constitutional protection even though programs have religious objectives, because programs are
not "pervasively religious"). See Linder, supra note 76, at 1886; cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976) (private school that appealed to a public constituency in commercial advertising prop-
erly subject to federal anti-discrimination laws).
154. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20 ("Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares
not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctive personal
aspects of one's life."); cf. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring) ("choices... that are
Iprivate' in the sense that they are not part of a commercial relationship offered generally or
widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual entering into a personal relation-
ship, certainly were never intended to be restricted by the 19th century Civil Rights Acts"). See
generally Marshall, supra note 35, at 82.
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tion of certain kinds of religious conduct from generally applicable leg-
islation is common." 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court's decisions under
the free exercise clause often find such exemptions to be constitutionally
required, since under its holdings government may prohibit or burden
religiously based action only when the prohibition or burden is "neces-
sary" to vindicate a "compelling" state interest.156 The overwhelming
majority of these cases, however, have involved individual conduct;
only a few have dealt with religious groups that sought relief as groups
from generally applicable government action.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 57 the Court held that the Old Order Amish
were constitutionally entitled to an exemption from certain compulsory
schooling laws. The rationale articulated by the Court was that the
Amish provided their children with the functional equivalent of a voca-
tional education in agriculture, and failure to exempt the Amish would
result in the eventual destruction of their culture. Thus, the state's ad-
mittedly compelling interest in providing for the education of its citi-
zens apparently was outweighed in the constitutional balance by the
claim of the Amish to the preservation and integrity of their religious
culture.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion exudes an unmistakable admiration
for the Amish lifestyle, praising their industry and self-reliance as being
in the best traditions of American capitalism and the Protestant
ethic. ' Accordingly, Yoder, although an interesting case, is not
thought to be doctrinally significant, especially since the Amish are a
numerically insignificant group in relation to almost every aspect of
American life. At most, the case means that socially marginal religious
groups whose practices are not fundamentally inconsistent with those
of the majority are constitutionally entitled to exemptions from bur-
densome legislation."5 9
155. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04, 407; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); West Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,639 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 306
(1940). See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1252-53.
157. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
158. Id. at 222, 224-26.
159. See Bradley, supra note 117, at 292. See also Lee, 455 U.S. at 252. Yoder is consistent
with Donald Gianella's observation that, in evaluating free exercise problems, the Court "has
followed a course that ultimately intimates a judicial approval of established orthodox values."
Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development-Part P The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1381, 1385 (1967). See also R. SmITH, supra note 83, at 88 (the
due process clause protects only "conventional" behavior and "reasonable" expectations).
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A decade later in Bob Jones University v. United States,160 the
Court held by an eight-to-one margin that certain racially discrimina-
tory practices by a fundamentalist Protestant bible college justified rev-
ocation of its federal tax exemption by the Internal Revenue Service,
notwithstanding district court findings that the school's commitment to
the practices was both sincere and religiously based."'6 In the words of
the Court, "the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination [that] substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of
their religious beliefs."' 6 2
After a civil war, three constitutional amendments, and persistent
racial tension and strife, the elimination of racial discrimination surely
counts as a compelling government interest in constitutional law. Per-
haps even preferred rights like the free exercise of religion should be
overridden by the objective of eliminating race discrimination, at least
when, as in Bob Jones, the government action does not prohibit out-
right the exercise of a religious belief, but only makes it more expen-
sive."' Yet the Bob Jones Court did not explain the apparently con-
trary result in Yoder, in which the state's compelling interest in
compulsory education was held not to override the free exercise rights
of the, Amish. Bob Jones thus confirmed the marginality of the Yoder
decision. A free exercise decision protecting Bob Jones University's tax
exemption despite that institution's discriminatory practices would
have had a far broader reach than did the exemption granted the Amish
in Yoder. The political and social cost of such a holding in Bob Jones
was just too high.
After Yoder and Bob Jones, it was not clear that the free exercise
clause afforded religious groups any significant constitutional protec-
tion from burdensome governmental action. The protection that might
have been rooted in a broad reading of Yoder was cut short by the ap-
parent message of Bob Jones that religious group autonomy interests do
not Outweigh the government's interest in implementing important so-
cial goals that affect wide segments of society.
Another line of religion clause cases has involved disputes among
members of religious congregations and hierarchies. Although at the
level of the Supreme Court, these cases have most often involved con-
160. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
161. Id. at 580-81, 584, 595, 602 n.28.
162. Id. at 604.
163. See supra note 4 and text accompanying note 156.
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troversies over title to church property, 164 they also have included dis-
putes over ecclesiastical office and church hiring decisions. 165
In the typical fact scenario of these cases, a church divides itself
into two or more theologically inconsistent factions over a doctrinal or
other disagreement. At some point it becomes clear that the factions
cannot or will not reconcile within the boundaries of existing church
beliefs and practices, and that the dispute must resolve itself by the cre-
ation of a separate church for each faction. A new dispute then arises
over which faction is entitled to the property and offices of the pre-
existing church. Both factions, of course, claim to be the "true" church
and, therefore, the rightful custodians. The faction that does not pos-
sess or otherwise control the property or the offices generally brings suit
requesting judicial determination of their legal status. 166
The Court has developed a religion clause analogue to the political
question doctrine that disposes of many of these cases. To the extent
that the resolution of this kind of litigation depends upon interpreta-
tion of religious doctrine, the Court defers to the interpretation ad-
vanced by the church's internal governing structure. 167 If no such inter-
pretation is forthcoming, the Court generally must abstain from
adjudicating the case rather than rendering the interpretation itself, be-
cause theological and ecclesiastical questions are not justiciable. 161
However, there is an important exception to this doctrine. If the Court
determines that it can resolve the case according to "neutral legal prin-
ciples" without resort to interpretation of religious doctrine, it need not
pay any attention to the church's interpretation of relevant religious
doctrine or other theological commands. 169
The rationale for the church property cases is that judicial resolu-
tion of theological or ecclesiastical disputes, even when necessary to
resolve litigation, would impermissibly entangle the government in the
affairs of religion. 170 Because the prohibition on church-state entangle-
ment is thought to protect religion from the state,171 as well as the state
from religion, the cases are filled with language about the constitutional
164. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
165. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Dio-
cese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
166. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1089 (3d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
167. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450-51; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426
U.S. at 713, 720-21, 724-25; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 18; Watson, 80 U.S. at 725, 727, 730.
168. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1231.
169. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 601. See generally NOWACK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 166,
at 1089, 1092.
170. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603, 604.
171. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1226-37 passim.
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value of church autonomy. 172 However, this line of cases has at least as
much to do with judicial competence as church autonomy. 17 3 After all,
when religiously neutral legal doctrine suggests a resolution, church au-
tonomy is irrelevant, and the Court may resolve the dispute in a way
that ignores and even contradicts the result that would have been indi-
cated by deference to church polity.1 74
Nevertheless, the autonomy rhetoric of these cases is not empty.
For example, in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,"5 the Court faced
a dispute over control of valuable real estate owned by the Russian
Orthodox church in New York City. Following the October Revolu-
tion of 1917, the Soviet government had obtained effective control over
the governing hierarchy of the central church administration, which is
located in Moscow. Understandably upset that their church and its
property were now controlled by "godless communists," the members
of the North American diocese of the church prevailed upon the New
York legislature to enact a law vesting title to the church-owned prop-
erty in the diocese rather than in the Moscow hierarchy. The Court held
the law unconstitutional as an infringement of the free exercise
clause. 17 6
From one standpoint, Kedroff is a straightforward application of
the "religious question" doctrine elaborated by the later church prop-
erty decisions. Because there was no evidence of ownership or control
of the disputed property that would have permitted a decision for either
party on neutral legal principles, the Court had no choice but to defer to
the decision dictated by church ecclesiology, which clearly vested title
and control in the central church hierarchy.' 7 Kedroff is startling be-
cause it was handed down, not in an era of glastnost or even detente, but
in 1952, in the midst of post-war American fear of Soviet world domi-
nation and communist conspiracies. The Court's holding left religious
property that was located in the United States and that served the spiri-
tual needs of its citizens, under the effective control of the Soviet Union
at the very time that Joseph McCarthy was traversing the country ruin-
ing reputations and careers with the mere accusation of Soviet complic-
ity. 78 That the Court was willing to swim against the strong, even par-
172. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115-16, 119;
Watson, 80 U.S. at 733. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8 1, at 1236; Howe,
supra note 89, at 92, 94.
173. See Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note 89, at 1010.
174. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 613 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
175. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
176. Id. at 97-99, 101-03, 121.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
178. For accounts of the mood of the government and the country generally during this
period, see D. HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS THAT BE 140-45, 190-200 (1979); T. WHITE, IN SEARCH OF
HISTORY 355-56, 374-82 passim, 383-96 (1978).
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anoiac, anti-communist currents of the period to uphold the principle
of church autonomy bespeaks more than mere lip service to the
principle.
The suggestion of a right of religious group autonomy in Kedroff
lay dormant for some time, but it did not die. In Serbian Eastern Ortho-
dox Diocese v. Milivojevich,'79 decided more than twenty years after
Kedroff, the Court turned the suggestion of religious group autonomy
rights into substantive constitutional doctrine. Serbian Eastern Ortho-
dox was a civil action by the former bishop and certain members of the
North American diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox church, who
claimed that the central church hierarchy located in Belgrade, Yugosla-
via, had taken actions against the bishop and the diocese in violation of
hierarchical and diocesan law. As in Kedroff, the action appeared to be
at least partially motivated by fear of Communist control of the church
hierarchy.' 8 0 The court below had essentially sided with the plaintiffs,
holding that proceedings that resulted in certain of the actions com-
plained of were not conducted according to the central church's consti-
tution and penal code, and that the remaining action was invalid as
beyond the central church's. authority to effectuate under its govern-
ance documents without diocesan approval. ' I Despite ample evidence
in the record supporting the lower court holding, the Supreme Court
reversed:
[W]here resolution of [intra-church] disputes cannot be made
without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and
polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that
civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest eccle-
siastic tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but
must accept such decisions as binding on them in their appli-
cation to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before
them. 18 2
In the Court's view, judicial review is inappropriate even when, as in
Serbian Eastern Orthodox, a church appears to have acted arbitrarily by
violating its own laws.' 83 Although it did not decide whether the cen-
tral church hierarchy in Serbian Eastern Orthodox in fact had acted ar-
bitrarily, as the plaintiffs claimed, the Supreme Court nevertheless
strongly criticized the state court for having rejected the hierarchy's
179. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
180. Id. at 704, 706.
181. Id. at 708.
182. Id. at 709.
183. Id. at 71 !-14 (rejecting an "arbitrariness" exception to the general rule of deference
to the decisions of hierarchical church authorities).
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plausible and well-supported interpretations of church law and prac-
tice, in favor of the court's own interpretations. 1
84
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox, then, the Court began to push
against the weight of some individualistic assumptions that underlie the
law of voluntary associations. Constitutions, bylaws, charters, and
other such documents of voluntary associations are often viewed not
only as instruments of self-government, but also as sources of legal pro-
tection for the individual association members."8 5 Under this view, a
voluntary association's violation of one of its internal governing laws
contradicts the legitimate expectations of members who are assumed to
have relied on the association's continued adherence to its laws.' 86 Af-
ter Serbian Eastern Orthodox, however, a claim by a religious group
member to contractual due process or other contract-based protections
against group action is overridden by the group's interest in interpret-
ing its own laws and practices without government interference, even if
under neutral legal principles the claim would appear to be valid and
the group's interpretation erroneous. The apparent judgment of the
Court is that the importance of religious group autonomy in self-gov-
ernment is such that it constitutionally outweighs even individual rights
of contract.
In the subsequent case of National Labor Relations Board v. Catho-
lic Bishop, ' 7 the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act did
not confer jurisdiction on the NLRB to regulate the employee relations
of religious institutions. The Court reasoned that permitting such em-
ployees to unionize would result in significant loss of control by reli-
gious employers over their religious programs. NLRB jurisdiction
could have placed a religious institution in the position of being forced
to hire and to retain employees with beliefs that are inconsistent with,
or even antithetical to, those of the employer. In the Court's view, Con-
gress did not intend any such result.'II
But what if Congress had intended NLRB jurisdiction? Because
the Court decided Catholic Bishop on statutory interpretation grounds,
it did not reach the constitutional issue, although free exercise concerns
clearly animate the opinion."8 9 In the wake of Bob Jones, one might
well have predicted that the strong and pervasive social policy favoring
184. Id. at 717-20.
185. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 33, at 1383-85.
186. For example, this is Justice Rehnquist's implicit interpretation of the pre-Kedroff
cases cited by the majority (see, e.g., Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)), which were decided under federal common law rather than on
constitutional grounds. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 727-30 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
187. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
188. Id. at 497-99, 501-07.
189. See id. at 499-501.
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collective bargaining, together with the individual teachers' constitu-
tional rights to associate in labor unions, would outweigh any religious
group autonomy interest in the constitutional balance. Moreover, the
Court's apparent commitment to church autonomy as a principle, evi-
denced by Kedroff and Serbian Eastern Orthodox, may have been called
into question by its subsequent holding in Jones v. Wolf that a court
need not defer to the decisions of church polity when the court believes
itself capable of resolving the dispute under religiously neutral
principles.
Hence, the stage was set for Amos. By upholding, under the estab-
lishment clause, broad exemptions from the requirements of generally
applicable legislation for churches and other religious organizations,
the Court reaffirmed a commitment to religious group autonomy. Of
equal significance is the Amos Court's step toward the demarginaliza-
tion of Yoder. Although exempting all activities of religious organiza-
tions from the requirements of Title VII subjects the employee labor
market to religious discrimination by all religious employers, the Court
upheld the exemption. Yoder might now be characterized more
broadly: whenever government action so severely pressures a religious
group's concept of itself that its very existence is threatened, the first
amendment generally commands that the government, not the group,
be the one that yields, even if the resulting anti-social consequences are
not narrowly confined, as they were in Yoder.
Bob Jones can be distinguished by the uniquely weighty govern-
ment interest present in that case. Given the tortured history of the
United States in mistreating racial minorities, the elimination of racial
discrimination is perhaps the most compelling governmental interest in
American constitutional law, short of the government's interest in its
own preservation. Accordingly, government action in service to this
particular interest is upheld even when such action pressures a religious
group's core values, so long as the action does not by its terms require
the group physically to disband. The Bob Jones opinion clearly assumes
that the physical existence of Bob Jones University is not seriously im-
plicated by the decision to revoke its federal tax exemption on race dis-
crimination grounds, even though it may be economically coerced to
abandon a core concern.1 90 Other government action that pressures
190. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603-04 ("Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a
substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools
from observing their religious tenets"). See also TRIBE, CONSrTUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at
1246-47.
The Court significantly liberalized this analysis recently in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988). In Lyng, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to
a Forest Service road construction plan to facilitate timber harvests on federally owned land which
included a traditional native American burial site. Id. at 1321-23. Although it acknowledged that
implementation of the plan "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac-
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religious group existence, however, would yield to the group's interest
in its own autonomy.
Nevertheless, the protection afforded religious groups under the
institutional free exercise cases remains incomplete even after Amos.
Under the Court's interpretations of both Catholic Bishop and Amos, it
was congressional dispensation which saved religious groups from gov-
ernment intervention into religious group membership decisions. The
Court did not decide in either case what the Constitution required, but
only what it permitted.19 1 Accordingly, the question that the Court
avoided in Dayton Christian Schools remains open: When does the free
exercise clause demand that religious groups be exempted from compli-
ance with generally applicable legislation? Until the Court addresses
this issue, it remains unclear whether and to what extent the Court is
prepared to extend constitutional protection to religious groups.
V. PROTECTING THE RELIGIOUS GROUP INTEREST IN SELF-DEFINITION
The Supreme Court's freedom of association decisions provide lit-
tle protection for the religious group interest in self-definition. Several
of the Court's free exercise decisions suggest the existence of a constitu-
tionally based religious group right to self-definition, but this sugges-
tion is undercut by other precedents, and the Court has never squarely
addressed the issue. Dayton Christian Schools, for example, does not
speak to the issue of religious group self-definition, except to the extent
tices... intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features" of the land subject to the
plan, the Court nevertheless held that since the plan did not actually "coerce individuals into
acting contrary to their beliefs," the government was under no obligation to present a compelling
justification for the plan. Id. at 1326; see also id. at 1324, 1325. Thus, the Court treats Lyng as if it
were about indirect regulation of religious exercise, a subject beyond the scope of this Article. See
supra note 4. However, Lyng can be read as holding that when government acts in its land-owning
rather than its regulatory capacity, a relatively unimportant government goal will sustain govern-
ment action that indirectly burdens free exercise rights even when the burden threatens to destroy a
religious community. Because the Lyng Court's analysis relies so heavily on the fact that the gov-
ernment owned the land subject to the plan, see, e.g., id. at 1327, 1328, it is unclear what effect, if
any, Lyng might have on group free exercise rights directly burdened by generally applicable law,
such as the state and federal anti-discrimination statutes at issue in Dayton Christian Schools and
Amos. Cf. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Winnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (reaffirming Supreme
Court precedent that holds dormant commerce clause inapplicable to states acting in their capac-
ity as market participants rather than market regulators).
191. It is not a sufficient explanation of Catholic Bishop, Bob Jones, or Amos simply to
argue that the Supreme Court deferred to congressional judgments. Significant constitutional is-
sues always stand behind such deference. In Catholic Bishop, "deference" took the form of a
strained interpretation of congressional intent in order to avoid a conflict between the National
Labor Relations Act and the religion clauses. In Bob Jones, the Court deferred to administrative
actions of the IRS which Congress had not acted to modify or reverse, and in the process, the
Court ignored infringement of free exercise values. Finally, in Amos, deference to a legislative
exemption that clearly was overbroad under the establishment clause was driven by recognition of
the importance of religious group autonomy to individuals and to society, at least in the view of
two members of the Court.
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that it implicitly holds that the bare assertion by a state agency of regu-
latory jurisdiction over a religious group's membership decision does
not violate the free exercise clause.' 92 The Amos majority, committed
to a narrow establishment clause analysis,' 93 is likewise not very
helpful. '94
However, in his insightful concurring opinion in Amos, Justice
Brennan discusses what both Dayton Christian Schools and the Amos
majority ignore-the tri-cornered confrontation between individuals,
government, and religious groups.' 9 ' Justice Brennan notes that con-
stitutional protection of individual free exercise rights through invali-
dation of religious exemptions from anti-discrimination laws is incon-
sistent with the constitutional protection of religious groups. Loss by
religious groups of the right to discriminate on the basis of religion in
admission and expulsion of their members would unavoidably entail
loss of the capacity to define and to communicate the nature and con-
tent of their religious beliefs and practices. 196
In theory, this analysis suggests that only the religious activities of
religious organizations should be insulated from governmental action,
for it is only those activities which contribute to the identity of the or-
ganization as religious. However, the determination whether a particu-
lar activity is religious or secular is difficult and elusive, and can be
made only after a long and searching factual inquiry that would entan-
gle the government in religion and chill religious organizations in the
exercise of their rights. Because nonprofit religious organizations may
infuse even apparently secular activity with a plausible religious pur-
pose, Justice Brennan finds that a broad exemption relating to both the
secular and the religious activities of such a group is constitutionally
preferred to the church-state entanglement and chilling of free exercise
rights that may result from ad hoc division of nonprofit activities into
religious and secular categories. He thereby concurs in the constitution-
ality of the religious exemption to Title VII as applied to the activities of
nonprofit religious groups like the Mormon church:
Sensitivity to individual religious freedom dictates that reli-
gious discrimination be permitted only with respect to em-
ployment in religious activities. Concern for the autonomy of
religious organizations demands that we avoid the entangle-
ment and the chill on religious expression that a case-by-case
determination would produce. We cannot escape the fact that
192. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.
194. But see infra note 220.
195. Amos, 483 U.S. at 340-42 & n.2, 345-46 (Brennan, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 342-43.
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these aims are in tension. Because of the nature of nonprofit
activities, I believe that a categorical exemption for such en-
terprises appropriately balances these competing concerns.' 97
Justice Brennan explicitly rejects ad hoc balancing. He might be
read as advocating instead a definitional balance to resolve conflicts of
individual, government, and religious group interests. Alternatively, he
may be suggesting a categorical right for religious groups that would
enable the social and individual value of such groups to be realized fully
in the United States.
I discuss each of these aspects of Justice Brennan's opinion in the
context of how they might contribute to a constitutional theory that
justifies protection of a religious group's right to self-definition. How-
ever, I do not attempt to articulate and defend a full-blown theory of
religious group rights. My goal in the following subsections is to ex-
plore these theoretical possibilities for a jurisprudence of religious
group rights by focusing on the protection of religious group autonomy
in membership decisions, with a view to identifying the approach that
seems most preferable. I argue that categorical rights analysis is prefer-
able to both ad hoc balancing and definitional balancing. I conclude
with some observations on the potential and legitimacy of a rights-
based jurisprudence in light of the critique of rights that is increasingly
asserted in contemporary legal scholarship.
A. Ad Hoc Balancing
The problem posed by Amos and Dayton Christian Schools-when
should religious group claims to self-definition be vindicated against
individual rights and societal interests-seems to arise on a continuum
between absolute religious group freedom and pervasive state intrusion
into membership decisions. There is a temptation to condemn both
poles as unacceptably extreme. Absolute religious group freedom sub-
verts state sovereignty by placing membership decisions beyond the
reach of state power, and it erodes individual autonomy by leaving the
group with substantial control over the lives of those who wish to be-
long. 198 However, absolute state sovereignty ultimately must result in
the demise of religious groups whose core concerns are inconsistent
with the majority's normative conceptions of individual rights and soci-
197. Id. at 345-46. The limitation of the analysis to nonprofit religious groups reflects
Justice Brennan's perception that nonprofit status is sufficiently disadvantageous relative to for-
profit status that one would not likely adopt the former merely to escape government regulation.
See id. at 344 n.4.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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etal interests. 199 Just as the grant of absolute religious group freedom
would seem unacceptable to a society that values individual autonomy
and effective government, so also the plenary regulation of membership
decisions should seem unacceptable to a society that values religious
pluralism and the individual freedom that accompanies it.
Not surprisingly, then, courts and commentators have proposed a
variety of ad hoc balancing tests to deal with individual-government-
religious group conflicts. These tests require courts to decide cases
based upon the presence or absence of specified characteristics. For ex-
ample, many commentators have argued that constitutional protection
of religious groups from government regulation should extend only to
those practices that are genuinely significant to the group's religiosity.
Bruce Bagni would balance the strength of the governmental regulatory
interest in a particular case against the centrality of the burdened prac-
tice to the religious group.200 As a religious practice becomes more dis-
tant from the "purely spiritual life" of the religious community, it is less
deserving of constitutional protection and more susceptible to being
overridden by regulatory interests that are not compelling. 20 1 Simi-
larly, William Marshall and Douglas Blomgren would confine constitu-
tional protection of religious group activity to "religious exercise,"
which they understand to mean identifiable tenets or practices.20 2 As-
pects of communal religious life that do not come within this category
are protected only to the extent that they fall under the shadow of other
constitutional umbrellas, such as freedom of association.203 Douglas
Laycock would consider, in addition to Bagni's notion of centrality,
whether the burdened practice impacts outsiders or is confined only to
group members. He argues that greater protection should extend to
practices of the latter description. 20 4 Laycock also would have courts
consider the extent to which the regulation at issue intrudes upon inter-
199. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. This has not deterred some commentators
from advocating virtually plenary judicial intervention into religious group affairs. See, e.g., Ell-
man, supra note 33, at 1400-05, 1421-44; Adams & Hanlon, supra note 33, at 1332-39.
200. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimina-
tion by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539-49 (1979). Carl Esbeck would also
focus on a notion of religious centrality, although he locates this right in the establishment clause
rather than the free exercise clause. Esbeck, supra note 26, at 376-78. See also Note, Reinterpreting
the Religious Clauses, supra note 38, at 1774-75.
201. Bagni, supra note 200, at 1539-40.
202. Marshall & Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment
Clause, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 293, 327-28 (1986).
203. Id. at 328. Professor Marshall has argued elsewhere that the free exercise clause has
no substantive content independent of freedom of expression generally. See Marshall, supra note
116.
204. Laycock, supra note 57, at 1403-12. See also Judicial Control of Private Associations,
supra note 89, at 1047.
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nal group affairs, with substantial intrusions weighing on the side of
greater protection from regulation.2 5
In one sense, these various tests are all theoretically impeccable.
They are all directed at discovering and protecting the "core concerns"
of religious groups-an idea central to the protection of religious group
autonomy in making membership decisions. Nevertheless, in practice
these tests are all unlikely to be effective in protecting a religious
group's interest in self-definition. As I have argued, the incompatibility
of religious groups with liberal political theory and with the secularism
of public culture tends to push political decisionmaking away from pro-
tection of religious group interests when such protection would be at
the expense of either individual rights or government interests.20 6 A
decision in favor of religious group self-definition requires that a judge
labor against the combined forces of a political system in which govern-
ment regulation and individual rights talk are both commonplace, and
a culture that generally values rationalism over the nonrational ways of
knowing, understanding, and living that characterize much of religious
life. Although some judges succeed in looking beyond this political and
cultural bias, the broad discretion that inevitably must be exercised by
legal decisionmakers under an ad hoc balancing scheme is not likely to
give significant weight to religious group self-definition.
Lower court decisions bear this out. Notwithstanding the impor-
tant social and individual values served by a strong right of religious
group autonomy, these cases generally subordinate such autonomy to
interests served by regulatory intervention or control.20 7 Religious sig-
nificance is discounted, 208  burdens on religious exercise are mini-
205. Laycock, supra note 57, at 1403-12. See also Esbeck, supra note 26, at 367-68.
206. See supra Part III.
207. Of course, not all of the decisions are unfavorable to religious groups. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Central Cath. High School, 623 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996
(1981); Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960 (D. Utah 1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). See
also Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 435, 441-43 (N.D. I11. 1984) (requirement that
theology teachers at traditionally Jesuit university be Jesuits held to be a bona fide occupational
qualification).
208. For example, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. 1981), the court held that only the hiring of ministerial employees by the seminary is
exempt from Title Vll under § 702, because "the tasks [nonministerial employees) perform are not
of an ecclesiastical or religious nature," notwithstanding the fact that nonministerial employees
clearly contributed to the seminary's identity as a religious group. Id. at 284-85. For the same
reasons, the court further held that a free exercise exemption for nonministerial employees was not
constitutionally compelled. Id. at 287. Similarly, the court in EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626
F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), held that a religious college's faculty
hiring procedures were not exempt from Title VII under § 702 because
[tihe College is not a church. The College's faculty and staff do not function as ministers.
The faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its congregation. They
neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of
religious doctrine. That faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing
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mized, 2°9 and Supreme Court precedent is narrowly distinguished.21 °
As a group, the lower court decisions in this area seem remarkably free
of the influence of Kedroff, Serbian Eastern Orthodox, and Catholic
Bishop. 2
1 1
Perhaps the greatest flaw of these various tests is that they presup-
pose a judicially identifiable religious practice as a necessary predicate
Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment matters
of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern.
Id. at 485. See also Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.
1985) (because Dominicans imposed few religious qualifications on faculty, students, or adminis-
trators, the principal mission of a university owned, controlled, and operated by the Dominican
Order was determined to be the provision of secular education), vacated on reh'g en banc, 793 F.2d
398, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying, by an equally divided court, enforcement of NLRB order),
incorporated by reference into dissent from denial of enforcement, id. at 403; Brown v. Dade Chris-
tian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 312-13, 314 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (religious school engaging in
racial discrimination found to be "avowedly secular" despite fact that its segregationist beliefs
were derived from the Bible), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago,
585 F. Supp. 435, 439-40 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (university held not to be an institution "controlled in
whole or in substantial part" by a religious group despite long and close association with Jesuits,
because Jesuits comprised only a small minority of the faculty, did not contribute substantial
amounts of money to the operating budget, and did not attempt to direct Jesuit trustees and ad-
ministrators on university matters). Lurking behind many of these decisions is the notion that
what is "religious" is bounded by what the world at large finds to be of general, secular interest.
But cf. Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 978 (D. Mass. 1983) ("a religious
activity of a religious organization does not lose that special status merely because it holds some
interest for persons not members of the faith, or occupies a position of respect in the secular world
at large"); R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 173 ("the distinction between sacred and secular is
somewhat artificial. It does not accord with the church's comprehensive definition of its
mission.").
209. For example, in EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986),
the court reviewed under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act a church-owned school's practice of
funding health insurance only for single employees and married male employees. Id. at 1364.
Based on scripture, the church believed that "in any marriage, the husband is the head of the
household and is required to provide for that household." Id. The court determined that funding
health insurance for all employees would have "no significant impact" on this belief, id. at 1368,
thereby ignoring the difficulty of preaching a belief without being permitted to practice it even at a
symbolic level. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. See also Universidad Central, 793 F.2d
389, 390 (arguing that NLRB jurisdiction imposed no burden on a Catholic university because the
university is free to appeal NLRB orders to the court of appeals, and any burden is outweighed by
compelling interest in avoiding labor unrest); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272,
1280 (9th Cir. 1982) (a church.doctrine prohibiting lawsuits between church members was overrid-
den by the government interest in eradicating all forms of discrimination); Mississippi College, 626
F.2d at 487-88 & nn. 12-13 (characterizing the Title VII compliance burden on a private religious
college as "hypothetical" despite EEOC's declared intention to investigate the college's religiously
based preference for males); Donovan v. Shenendoah Baptist Church, 573 F. Supp. 320, 325
(W.D. Va. 1983) (religious school lacks standing to assert rights of employees, students, and par-
ents associated with school).
210. E.g., Universidad Central, 793 F.2d at 386-88, 404-06; Salvation Army of Massachu-
setts, 763 F.2d at 5-6; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 772-73; Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1272; see Dade
Christian Schools, 556 F.2d at 325, 326 (dissenting opinion).
211. Perhaps this is not altogether surprising since, as Steven Smith has observed, consti-
tutional law casebook editors have largely ignored these cases as well. See S. Smith, Of Separation
and Secularism: Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision 136 (forthcoming in 66 TEx. L.
Rav. (1989)) (manuscript in author's possession).
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to constitutional relief from government regulation. The district court
decision in Amos exemplifies this approach. That court determined that
there must exist two of three enumerated relationships in order for reli-
gious group activity to be "religious": (1) a close and substantial rela-
tionship between the religious organization and the activity at issue in
the ordinary course of engaging in the activity; (2) a substantial connec-
tion between "the primary function of the activity in question" or "the
nature of the job the employee is performing," and "the religious tenets
or rituals of the religion or matters of church administration"; and (3) a
substantial relationship between "the employee's job and church ad-
ministration or the religious organization's rituals or tenets."'2 12
The second and third elements of this test require the identification
of a tenet or practice of the religious group that is burdened or other-
wise implicated by the challenged regulation. Only if the court identifies
such a tenet or practice, does it then decide whether this is closely re-
lated to the disputed employment position under the court's test. Ac-
cordingly, the district court in Amos looked for some authoritative
command of Mormonism to which the plaintiff's job or the Deseret
Gym as a whole was integrally related. After considering a variety of
possibilities, it concluded that nothing in the church's operation of the
gym was "even tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief
or ritual of the Mormon church or church administration., 213
Admittedly, the policy of requiring that all Mormon church em-
ployees be temple-worthy is not a tenet or practice of the Mormon
faith. Certainly there is no identifiable commandment, or even a consis-
tently applied policy, that bars non-tithe payers from church employ-
ment, even when their salaries are supplied from tithing funds.21 4
The imperative of the church's sacrifice narrative, to which tithing
is integrally related, does not stem from an easily identified article of
Mormon faith. It comes more from the church's intuition of religious
propriety than it does from a discrete belief or doctrine. Respect for the
sacrifice offered by those faithful Mormons who built and continue to
build their religious community makes it unseemly to use those sacri-
212. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 799.
213. Id. at 802. See also id. at 801 ("plaintiffs do not contend and there is no evidence that
it is a fundamenial tenet of the Mormon Church that its members must engage in physical exercise
and activity and must do so in a gymnasium owned and operated by the Mormon Church and in
which all employees are practicing members of the Mormon Church").
214. For example, an attempt to enforce tithe-paying by the faculty of the church-owned
Brigham Young University in the late 1950s and early 1960s was perceived as intruding upon
academic freedom even by some members of the Mormon hierarchy and ultimately was aban-
doned. G. BERGRA & R. PRIDDis, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY: A HousE OF FAITH 68-70 (1985).
Imposition of the temple-worthiness requirement for employees at church-owned operations like
the Deseret Gym itself reflected a relatively recent change in church policy. See Amos, 618 F.Supp.
at 1019-21.
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fices to benefit unfaithful Mormons. This sense of propriety is closely
related both to the Mormon doctrine of tithing and to the Mormon
community's sense of what it means to be Mormon.2 15
The district court was guilty of overstatement when it declared that
neither the gym nor the plaintiff's job were related to the beliefs, rituals,
or administration of the Mormon church. 21 6 The opinion illustrates
that narrow categories like doctrine, practice, or administration do not
capture all or even most of the essential intentions, commitments, be-
liefs, settings, and stories that create the narratives of a religious group,
that is, those very things that bind individuals together into a commu-
nity of belief.217 State intervention into the affairs of a religious com-
munity frequently destroys the daily development of the group's histor-
ical and theological narratives. Accordingly, government regulation
may seriously disrupt and distort the spiritual life of that community
even when the state's demands would not violate clearly identifiable
doctrines, beliefs, or practices. Such intervention breaks the link be-
tween evolution of group meaning and group authority and thus rein-
terprets and recasts such meaning. 2 ' Historical and theological narra-
tives often exist as unconscious or subconscious phenomena in the lives
of individual members. Thus, focusing attention on an aspect of reli-
gious group life that otherwise would be perceived by the group as un-
remarkable may interfere with the normal development of the commu-
nity's spiritual life and may channel that development in new directions
which otherwise would not have been taken.21 9
215. The fact that the church has not always formulated its employment policies with this
sense of narrative propriety in mind should not bar it from recognizing the narrative's significance
now. Religious groups are not ruled by the dead hand of past generations, and they sometimes
change the interpretation and meaning of their history and traditions. Evolution of belief and
practice is a central aspect of most religious groups and is necessary for their survival. See supra
text accompanying notes 41-56, 75-77. Nevertheless, one court has held that the power of church
members to change a belief or practice is evidence that the belief or practice is not religious. Dade
Christian Schools, 556 F.2d at 312-13.
216. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
217. See Laycock, supra note 57, at 1390-91:
Many activities that obviously are exercises of religion are not required by conscience or
doctrine [e.g., singing in the church choir or saying the rosary]. Any activity engaged in
by a church as a body is an exercise of religion. ... It is not dispositive that an activity is
not compelled by the official doctrine of a church or the religious conscience of an indi-
vidual believer.
Compare Dade Christian School, 556 F.2d at 312-13 (school's belief in segregation held not reli-
gious despite biblical origins because sponsoring church had no written tenets requiring segrega-
tion, because no references to segregation were present in church literature, and because the belief
was characterized by the church as a "policy" subject to change by its members, rather than as
"doctrine" or "tenet"); see supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
219. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,613 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The neutral
principles approach ... imposes on the organization of churches additional legal requirements
which in some cases might inhibit their formation by forcing the organizers to confront issues that
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Notably, the possibility of such disruption is ignored by the
Supreme Court in Dayton Christian Schools. The Court's decision as-
sumes that any necessary constitutional relief can be granted after the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission has completed its investigation and im-
posed a remedy upon the school. However, as the Court recognized in
Amos, the distortion of a religious group's narrative stems from the
possibility of government jurisdiction, not merely from its pronounce-
ment and enforcement of a remedy unacceptable to the group.2 2 ° By
the time a court reviews the merits of regulatory intervention under the
rule of Dayton Christian Schools, the damage to the religious group is
already done.
Ad hoc balancing requires that the judge accurately perceive and
characterize the aspects of communal religious life that are burdened by
the challenged government action. Yet, the religious experience does
not easily translate into the rational language required by the legal sys-
tem. 22' As a result, aspects of any religious community may be under-
valued because of an inability to adequately or accurately describe their
nature, meaning, or significance in rational terms. Moreover, the judge
will bring to this inquiry his or her own perceptions of what constitu-
otherwise might never arise."); Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note 89, at 991 ("The
more extensively courts supervise the internal affairs of associations, the more likely it is that they
will require strict adherence to purpose and doctrines without allowing for a group's natural
evolution."). Curiously, Marshall and Blomgren recognize this problem, yet find it constitution-
ally insignificant. Compare Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 202, at 308 ("regulatory programs
are often burdensome and the natural inclination of any regulated entity is often to adjust volun-
tarily the way it operates in order to promote its own ease of compliance. At times, the effect may
be totally subconscious.") with id. at 309 ("theological development is not itself theology, or, even
if it is .... ephemeral development of doctrine cannot properly be held to be within the ambit of
First Amendment protection").
220. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336:
[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial
liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is
hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a
judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission. Fear of potential
liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its
religious mission.
See also id. at 343-44 (Brennan, J., concurring):
While a church may regard the conduct of certain functions as integral to its mission, a
court may disagree. A religious organization therefore would have an incentive to char-
acterize as religious only those activities about which there likely would be no dispute,
even if it genuinely believed that religious commitment was important in performing
other tasks as well. As a result, the community's process of self-definition would be
shaped in part by the prospects of litigation.
Cf Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1443 (1962) ("Under [ad hoc
balancing], the right to speak and publish is never clear, since it is never defined. Whether one had
a right to speak or publish cannot be known until after the event and depends on the unpredictable-
weight which a court may someday give to 'competing interests'.").
221. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 85, at 1603-09.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
tionally protected interests look like222 and will usually possess reli-
gious sensibilities informed primarily by majoritarian beliefs and prac-
tices. In the case of idiosyncratic or obscure religious groups, then, the
court's general unfamiliarity with such groups could easily lead to
misconceptions. 223
Finally, religious groups are dynamic. Beliefs and doctrines
change. "At their most vital, traditions are always growing at the edge,
and sometimes taking the edge into the center."2 24 To an outsider, such
changes may seem arbitrary, and thus undeserving of constitutional
protection, particularly when the changes negatively affect important
individual and government interests. Accordingly, there is a risk that
important aspects of group religiosity will be overlooked or misunder-
stood in the process of balancing competing interests. Only the religious
group itself is capable of accurately assessing the significance of govern-
ment burdens on its religiosity, because only the group can accurately
identify and interpret the relevant historical and theological narratives.
Any ad hoc balancing test is unlikely to account for two important
aspects of religious group self-definition-the ability of the group freely
to interpret, and its ability to change the interpretation of, its own texts,
traditions, and narratives, and to abide by those interpretations in de-
ciding who shall and shall not associate with the group.225 Even the
multi-dimensional tests advocated by Professor Laycock and the Amos
district court do not protect a religious group's interest in self-defini-
tion. Neither centrality, internality, nor regulatory intrusiveness can ex-
plain why the Mormon church should prevail in Amos, any more than
doctrine, belief, practice, or administration explains why it should not.
Only when, the church's own interpretation of the demands of its his-
tory and beliefs is taken seriously, can one appreciate the magnitude of
the intrusion that would have been visited upon the church in the ab-
sence of an exemption from the requirements of Title VII.
222. See, e.g., S. HAUERWAS, supra note 36, at 57: "[Alttempts to explicate the 'ethics' of
scripture have tended to concentrate on those aspects... that fit our intuitive assumptions about
what an 'ethic' should look like. Mhis... has the unfortunate effect of separating and abstracting
the ethics from the religious (and narrative) contexts that make them intelligible."
Ball, Government as Big Brother to Religious Bodies, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, supra
note 14, at 20, 25:
[Ihe prosecution is ... prone ... to demand ... to know "just what tenet" of the
defendant's religion is violated by regulation. If the witness can't come up with a "tenet"
(such as the dogma of- transubstantiation) and then show that the government wants
specifically to eradicate that tenet (for example, "It is hereby decreed that no act of tran-
substantiation shall be performed") his religious liberty claim is said to lack substance.
223. See Garet, supra note 39, at 1033; Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note
89, at 991, 1010, 1016. See also Laycock, supra note 57, at 1388-90.
224. Perry, A Naturalist Perspective, supra note 67, at 1036.
225. See supra Part II.
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For better or for worse, a modern, liberal society is not generally
disposed to understand, let alone to sympathize with, a religious
group's insistence that the integrity of its community of belief requires
discrimination that is repugnant to the majority. As Justice Brennan
suggests, if the individual and social values of religious pluralism are to
be preserved, one must look beyond ad hoc balancing for protection of
the religious group interest in self-definition.226
B. Definitional Balancing
A commonplace of constitutional law is the Supreme Court judg-
ment that a certain constitutional principle is so important that society
should be willing to undergo considerable dislocation to protect it. For
example, a part of our national mythology is that the American crimi-
nal justice system protects the innocent, even if it also lets some of the
guilty escape unpunished. Also, we believe that even the guilty are enti-
tled to a measure of dignity and respect from government. This, service
to justice and freedom is not without social cost. Many accused
criminals go unpunished despite their guilt, and many more are proba-
bly not apprehended at all, because of the Court's insistence upon
broad protection for the constitutional interests that underlie the Bill of
Rights.227 The cost of protecting justice and freedom in this manner is
sobering, paid daily in the currency of physical and psychological vio-
lence inflicted upon the innocent victims of crime. To date, the Court
remains committed to pay the cost in order to preserve the integrity of
the Bill of Rights, although there are occasional indications that the
strength of this commitment may be eroding.228
This approach is regularly used in other areas of constitutional
law. Our commitment to freedom of the press and its institutional role
in representative government is so strong that we endure misleading
and distorted reporting by a media largely immune to liability for
libelous statements about government officials and public figures.2 2 9 So
highly do we value political speech that we do not permit police to si-
lence inflammatory speakers until criminal violence is imminent.230 We
suffer the dehumanizing and chauvinistic effects of pornography be-
cause of our belief in freedom of artistic expression and our fear of
226. Abandoning ad hoc balancing does not, however, mean that religious group rights
need be absolute. See infra text accompanying notes 283-95.
227. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
228. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
229. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
230. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
1989:99
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
government censorship.231 In general, individual rights and govern-
ment interests that otherwise would be vigorously pursued are left with
significantly less protection when they are perceived to conflict with
broader and weightier constitutional principles.
Such generalized or "definitional" balancing differs from ad-hoc
balancing. It is employed external to and independent of the context of
a particular case. The facts, circumstances, and competing interests of
particular litigants are not weighed, but rather the relative social and
political importance of certain individual rights, government interests,
and constitutional principles as general propositions.2
32
Because the factors of a definitional balance are considered in the
abstract and are not tied to the circumstances of a particular case, defi-
nitional balancing generates rules that can be applied in subsequent
cases without any further weighing of interests.2 3 Therefore, it is more
efficient than ad hoc balancing. This efficiency, however, comes at the
cost of foregoing the more precise calibrations of competing rights and
interests that are theoretically possible under ad hoc balancing.234
When the Court uses definitional balancing, the injustice that might be
imposed on individual litigants, and any depressing effect on society in
general, are simply outweighed by the constitutional principles that are
protected.
In Amos, Justice Brennan appears to have made this judgment
about religious groups. The considerable value of religious groups to
individuals and to society is sufficiently evident to him that he is willing
to permit substantial infringements on individual religious autonomy
and governmental regulatory interests in order to preserve the institu-
tional integrity and autonomy of religious groups. 235 This may be the
implicit judgment of the Amos majority as well. By definition, then, the
individual's right to be free from discrimination and the government's
interests in promoting a discrimination-free society are collectively out-
weighed by the right of religious groups to discriminate in the process
of defining themselves.
I have already discussed at length the strength and scope of the
religious group's interest in self-definition.236 I now turn to a consider-
ation of the related individual and government interests.
231. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). But see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49 (1973).
232. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDoM OF SPEECH § 2.03, at 2-17 (1984).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2-18 to -19; see Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 962 (1987).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
236. See supra Part II.
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1. INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
It is deeply rooted in modern American constitutional law that the
relative worth of individuals in society should be judged on the basis of
their social contributions and intrinsic worth as individuals, rather than
on the basis of irrelevant characteristics such as race, gender, ethnicity,
religious affiliation, and the like.2" 7 Anti-discrimination represents a
strong commitment to the autonomy of individuals, to their right freely
to make choices and to develop themselves as they see fit, rather than
resigning themselves to a station dictated by others.
When an individual is expelled from or denied admission to a reli-
gious group for failure to adhere to belief or behavioral standards that
the group deems essential for membership, autonomy is diminished.
The threat of expulsion or denial pressures the affected individual's reli-
gious conscience by creating an incentive for that individual to alter
beliefs and behavior to conform to religious group norms.
Nonmembers and nonconforming members of religious groups
are not the only individuals with autonomy interests at stake in individ-
ual-government-religious group conflicts. Conforming group members
have a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the group's rela-
tionships and evolving structures of belief and practice. Many individu-
als have developed a sense of personal identity and self-worth from in-
teractions with others in religious communities. Those who are satisfied
with the character and value of these interactions have a strong interest
in seeing that such interactions are preserved. Such preservation may
require discrimination.23 8 To the extent that the state intervenes and
disrupts or distorts such interactions in defense of the autonomy inter-
ests of nonmembers or nonconforming members, the individual auton-
omy of conforming members is likewise disrupted and distorted.239
There are, then, always at least two distinct individual interests at
stake in individual-government-religious group conflicts: the interest of
a nonmember or nonconforming member in being free from religious
discrimination by the group, and the interest of group members in
maintaining the integrity of their existing relationships with and within
the group. Nonmembers or nonconforming members of a religious
group who insist on the right to belong to the group without con-
forming to beliefs or practices considered important by the group, insist
upon the right to belong to the group on their own terms, rather than
those of the group itself.240
237. See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 H.iv. L. REv. 1 (1976).
238. This recalls the right to disassociation. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
239. Cf. Religion and the State, supra note 39, at 1748-49.
240. See Perry, A Naturalist Perspective, supra note 67, at 1037:
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It is unclear why the autonomy of the nonmember or the noncon-
forming member should prevail over that of the conforming member in
such situations; at most, they cancel each other out.241 In fact, individ-
ual interests may well weigh more heavily on the side of religious group
self-definition than on that of government intervention in any defini-
tional balance. When the government intervenes in religious group
membership decisions on behalf of nonmembers or nonconforming
members, it "kills" the group, causing it to change a fundamental as-
pect of its character or even physically to disband.24 2 Religious plural-
ism, and the choices of those individuals whose personal identity and
life are tied to the group, are reduced because the group that stands
behind the personal identity of conforming members no longer ex-
ists. 243 On the other hand, when the government refrains from inter-
vening in membership decisions, religious pluralism and individual
choice are maximized. The religious group remains intact and undis-
torted for all those members who reference their personal growth and
identity to it, while nonconforming members and nonmembers are still
free to join other groups whose core concerns more closely match the
self-concepts and aspirations of such persons. Thus, in considering the
interests of conforming members versus those of nonmembers and non-
conforming members, any weight to be applied to the definitional bal-
ance of individual, government, and religious group interests should
fall on the side of protecting religious group self-definition.
2. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
The strongest government interest implicated in an individual-gov-
ernment-religious group conflict is that of protecting individuals from
unlawful religious discrimination.2 44 For example, in Dayton Christian
Schools, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission intervened to remedy the
religious discrimination inflicted upon the fired teacher. Likewise, in the
[B]asic moral beliefs are less the property of individuals than of communities. That is,
they are less the property of human beings qua particular individuals than of human
beings qua members of particular communities. And, relatedly, the true test or measure
of such beliefs is not the experience of just one person. It is, rather, in some large degree,
the experience of the community, that is, the experience of the community not just at a
given moment, but over time.
(emphasis in original).
241. Cf. Frantz, supra note 220, at 1439 ("We cannot balance freedom against security [in
First Amendment cases] if they both belong on the same side of the scales.").
242. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
243. See Note, Reinterpreting the Religious Clauses, supra note 38, at 1474 ("Defined
functionally, a religion is a system of belief that is essential to the self-definition of the believer.
Thus, a society that failed to protect religion would foreclose the individual's choice of the most
fundamental part of his identity.").
244. See Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 981.
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absence of the exemption for religious organizations, the federal gov-
ernment would have a strong interest in intervening against religious
groups on behalf of employees like the Amos plaintiff to vindicate anti-
discrimination rights under Title VII.
Notwithstanding the pressure that is put on individual autonomy
by religious discrimination, the need for government intervention to
safeguard such autonomy is substantially diminished in religiously plu-
ral societies. There is a limit, after all, to the coercion that groups can
impose upon individuals. All groups, including the political community
that underlies the liberal state, are empowered to make law. Con-
sciously or unconsciously, groups generate, adopt, and maintain tradi-
tions by which their members will be bound; they then interpret the
components of those traditions as they are applied to concrete situa-
tions.245 However, nongovernmental groups can apply their law only
to their own members, and group members who object to and defy
group law are always free to leave the group. 246 Thus, the ultimate
sanction imposed by a nongovernmental group is merely the with-
drawal of fellowship.
This is not so with the law of the state. Though one may object to
it, that person cannot consistently defy it or withdraw from its reach.
Withdrawal from the interpretive community of the state to form a
competing interpretive community is an act of political revolution that
cannot be permitted if the state is to survive. Moreover, those who defy
the government are most assuredly not free to leave the political com-
munity. On the contrary, the government hunts them down for trial,
conviction, and punishment. The government thus holds a peculiar in-
terpretive monopoly: its myriad enforcement mechanisms give it the
exclusive capability to insist upon the preeminence of its law and inter-
pretations over all those who reside within its borders, whether they
conscientiously object or not.247
This difference between the coercion implicit in the law of the
group and that implied by the law of the state suggests a useful analytic
touchstone-the extent to which the group's power over nonmembers
and disaffected members approximates the government's power to pun-
ish those who defy its laws.248 Under this analysis, the coercive pres-
sure on religious conscience that might be imposed by the membership
245. See Cover, supra note 40, at 45.
246. See Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note 89, at 993 ("a significant
limitation on the power of the group to harm individuals lies in the ability of members to resign").
247. Cover, supra note 40, at 40-44; Levinson, supra note 48, at 386.
248. Cf. Howe, supra note 89, at 95 ("the price which [private] groups must pay for their
[constitutional] advantages is responsibility. When they exercise power in matters which directly
concern the state they lose their privacy and, claiming the prerogatives of sovereignty, may not
object if their action is treated as that of the state itself."). See also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 122 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In [decreeing that one party to
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requirements of a religious group should be constitutionally significant
if, and only if, withdrawal from the group is not possible.249
The most obvious example of this is when the religious group uses
physical coercion to maintain control over its members, such as threat-
ening physical harm to a group member if that member does not con-
form to group beliefs and practices or attempts to leave the group. Al-
though from time to time such religious groups have existed in the
United States, the use of physical violence to maintain membership
control is not common. Where it does exist, the government is free to
stop it.
Other, more problematic forms of coercion exist. Economic coer-
cion may exist when the religious group so dominates the local commu-
nity that a rejection of the group's beliefs or practices is tantamount to
renouncing employment in the community. A member is genuinely free
to leave a group only when economically viable alternatives are avail-
able. If reasonable alternative employment elsewhere is unobtainable,
then one really is not free to leave the group.2 5 °
There was no evidence that either the teacher in Dayton Christian
Schools or the custodial supervisor in Amos were unable to find employ-
ment elsewhere in their respective communities. Dayton Christian
Schools was not the only school in Dayton, nor was the Deseret Gym
the only entity in Salt Lake City with a staff of custodians in need of
supervision. Even when comparable employment is lacking within the
same city, other employment for which the disaffected employee is
qualified will usually be available.2 5' In both Dayton Christian Schools
and Amos, the terminated employees were still left with a wide range of
viable employment options.
Contrast this with the situation in which Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc. or the Mormon church were the only employers within a
city or other geographic region. In such a circumstance, the disaffected
employee would be unable to choose to leave the religious group. The
power of the religious group to impose its law on its members begins to
approximate the power of the state to insist on obedience to its law. The
the dispute should control the cathedral], the legislature effectively authorized one party to give
religious direction not only to its adherents but also to its opponents.").
249. See Note, Reinterpreting the Religious Clauses, supra note 38, at 1474:
In order for choice to be effective.... background social institutions must allow for the
formation of both [communal and individual] aspects of the self. Each community must
be free to create a collective identity, but no community should be so overpowering that
it threatens the individual's ability to define himself in opposition to it.
See also Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note 89, at 993-94.
250. Frug, supra note 33, at 1133-34.
251. See Note, Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organi-
zations: A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1375, 1420 (1987). Admittedly, the cost of changing jobs may be significant, as when one must
forfeit vested retirement benefits.
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disaffected member would be locked into group membership because he
or she would have no other employment options.2 52
Of course, such situations rarely occur in contemporary America.
The comparison of religious group power to government power thus is
less useful as a doctrinal test than as an illustration of the extent to
which government intervention into religious group membership deci-
sions is not necessary to protect individual autonomy. In a religiously
plural society like the United States, it is rare that a single religious
group, or any collection of religious groups, holds monopoly power
over employment, education, politics, or other such sources of contem-
porary social and economic advancement or fulfillment.253 In most in-
stances, the individual who is expelled from or denied admission to a
religious group has a range of economic and social alternatives to mem-
bership in that particular group.
Thus, when religious group membership is genuinely voluntary,
the need for government intervention to protect individual autonomy
upon an individual's rejection or expulsion from membership is sub-
stantially diminished. Individual autonomy is adequately protected by
religious pluralism. The remedy for religious group infringement upon
individual autonomy by discriminatory membership decisions is not
government intervention, but withdrawal from the discriminatory
group and subsequent association with other groups or individuals
whose beliefs and behavior are more congenial.2 54
Thus, the external harm imposed by discriminatory membership
decisions is typically marginal. The harm is usually confined to those
nonmembers who have attempted to join or to members who refuse to
leave despite rejection of core group values.2 5 5 Although it is common
252. Even here, the disaffected person arguably can relocate. Given the geographic mobil-
ity of contemporary Americans, the intrusion stemming from the relocation may well be out-
weighed by the intrusion on religious group autonomy.
253. Cf. Judicial Control of Private Associations, supra note 89, at 993-94.
254. Laycock, supra note 57, at 1403, 1409; cf. Karst, Intimate Association, supra note
138, at 640 ("There are sound reasons for the state to leave members of an ongoing intimate
association [to] carry on their relations with a minimum of state intervention. If they cannot work
out their differences, the exits are clearly marked."). See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 81, at 1420.
Of course, government has a legitimate interest in regulating religious groups even when
individual rights are not at stake. Health and safety standards, building codes, business and other
licensing requirements, and the like, are all formulated with the goal of protecting the members of
society from certain identifiable harms that manifest themselves in the absence of governmental
regulation. The free market rarely operates so as to make it economically advantageous for groups
to eradicate these harms voluntarily. Regulating groups and situations that present the potential
for widespread social harm is thus one way in which government protects individuals from the
consequences of market failure. Most religious group membership decisions do not provoke this
regulatory government interest in intervention.
255. Some exclusion is undoubtedly attributable to racial, gender, or other forms of dis-
crimination that are in fact unrelated to core concerns. Portions of the group are likely to argue,
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for critics of religious group power to quote statistics designed to show
the surprisingly large economic resources of religious groups,256 in fact
religious groups are not very important inputs for employment or capi-
tal in American markets.2 57 Relative to other concentrations of eco-
nomic resources, such as those in public corporations, small businesses,
and labor unions, the resources of American religious groups are insig-
nificant. The person who cannot get a job with a religious group retains
a multitude of other employment options. In contrast, the person who
cannot get a job with any public corporation or small business, or who
is denied membership in a labor union, has a far more serious problem.
When social and individual harm is as narrowly focused as it usually is
in religious group membership decisions, and the harm to religious au-
tonomy potentially so severe, the obvious balance for a court to strike is
exemption of the group from government regulation.258
however, that such discrimination is related to core concerns, so that in many cases it will be
unclear whether the discrimination is necessary to preservation of core concerns or not. See supra
text accompanying notes 50-53. Accordingly, if the values of religious pluralism are to be safe-
guarded to the greatest extent possible, it may be advisable to leave such discrimination unpun-
ished. See infra text accompanying notes 296-309.
256. See, e.g., Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 202, at 316-20.
257. Reliable statistics on this point are difficult to find. One source estimates that about
5% of the work force is employed by religious and nonreligious nonprofit organizations. Oleck,
Religious Nonprofit Organizations' Problems 1981 (Outline), in Course Materials for Registrants:
Religious Nonprofit Organizations' Legal Problems 1981 at 27 (seminar held March 13-14, 1981 at
Stetson University College of Law) (citing C. BAKAL, CHARiTY U.S.A. (1979)). The same source
reports that in 1979, nonprofit religious groups received about 46% of total charitable contribu-
tions or $20.1 billion. Id. at 28-30 (citing U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 28, 1980, at 14). Assum-
ing'that nonprofit employment is divided between religious and nonreligious in the same propor-
tion, one may estimate that about 2.3% of the national work force is employed by religious
groups. Moreover, although $20.1 billion is clearly a great deal of money, the sum is nevertheless
relatively insignificant on a national scale-less than 3% of the total national income in 1979.
The Department of Labor employment statistics, although they do not report religious em-
ployment separately, suggest a similarly small estimate of national religious group employment.
Total employment in the United States in 1986 was approximately 100 million persons. Total
employment in service industries, where one would expect the bulk of nonprofit religious employ-
ment to be concentrated, was approximately 23 million persons. Total employment in those partic-
ular service industries in which religious groups have historically concentrated their efforts and
resources-hospital and outpatient care, education, social and family services, and membership
organizations-was approximately 7.6 million persons. If one assumes that about one half of these
employers are religious, then total nonprofit religious employment in the United States is approxi-
mately 3.8% of the national workforce. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Apr. 1987, at 75-76, 85-86.
258. Stephen Pepper has extensively developed this point. Pepper, Taking the Free Exer-
cise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 310-11 [hereinafter Pepper, The Free Exercise
Clause]; Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9
N. Ky. L. REv. 265, 282-84 (1982); Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free
Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 341-44 [hereinafter Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Be-
yond]. However, Pepper would not grant the institutional exemption when there is direct, identifi-
able harm to individuals, as opposed to mere frustration of government regulatory interests. See
Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond, supra, at 333. As the text makes clear, I believe, exemption is
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If the individual autonomy of disaffected members or nonmembers
of particular religious groups is adequately protected by the association
options supplied by a religiously plural society, then the government
interest in intervening in religious group membership decisions is sub-
stantially less weighty than it would be in a nonplural society. The gov-
ernment is reduced to protecting society's self-concept. 259 The govern-
ment interest in intervention is actually a claim that the mere existence
of religious groups that do not conform to certain majoritarian norms
and values threatens or harms society. Alternatively, the interest in reg-
ulation might simply be paternalistic. The government regulates and
even outlaws those religious groups that it believes are not good for
their members, even though the members themselves think
differently.260
However, the government's paternalistic interest is remarkably
weak in a liberal society, and by itself is probably insufficient to justify
government intervention. 261 First, one may legitimately question the
factual premise of paternalistic intervention-that the government
truly knows better than individuals what is good or bad for them. As I
discussed earlier, what may look to the government like a "bad" restric-
tion of individual autonomy may actually enhance autonomy in the
long run.262 Moreover, a theoretical premise of liberalism is that gov-
ernment generally must be neutral with respect to all conceptions of
what is "good." The vision of the good life is pursued voluntarily by
individuals and cannot be imposed by the government.26 3 The govern-
appropriate even in this situation, so long as the social impact of the harm is not substantial and
the individuals harmed have other options, including avoidance of membership in any group.
For comparable analyses in which the legitimacy of local prohibition of certain kinds of
activities or relationships is held to depend on whether one can legally engage in the activity or
relationship in another nearby locale, see Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(reviewing city prohibition on all live entertainment) and Burt, The Constitution of the Family,
1979 Sup. CT. Rav. 329, 388-91 (criticizing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977),
which held unconstitutional a city zoning ordinance prohibiting certain kinds of extended families
from living together).
259. See Laycock, supra note 57, at 1403. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-56
(1976).
260. Cf S. Smith, supra note 211, at 121, 185 n. 111 (criticizing tendency of liberal theo-
rists to build political theories based on beliefs, values, and reasons which, in the theorists' view,
citizens should understand and use, but which in fact they do not).
261. See, e.g., TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1258:
[T]he state cannot impose its ideal of the "best possible life" as a way of justifying intru-
sion upon the religious autonomy of a citizen. The diffuse harm of depriving someone of
more advanced education and the best life the governing majority can imagine is not
enough to justify impinging upon the autonomy of a religious community.
(footnote omitted). See also id. at 1414-15.
262. See supra text accompanying note 97.
263. For descriptions of theoretical efforts to justify and achieve liberal neutrality, and
arguments that such efforts fail, see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)
(discussing Rawls); Perry, A Critique of the "Liberal" Political-Philosophical Project, 28 WM. &
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ment abandons this premise whenever it prohibits individuals, based on
its conception of the good, from voluntarily pursuing alternative vi-
sions of the good that do not significantly threaten either society or
other individuals. Accordingly, serious constitutional issues are impli-
cated whenever the government engages in value-creating enterprises,
or functions in a non-neutral fashion.264 The Court itself has expressly
recognized the legitimacy of regulating to achieve a moral conception
of the good only in the context of state efforts to regulate pornographic
materials.2
6 5
In a definitional balance of interests, the religious group's interest
in self-definition is counter-weighted only by the weak and illiberal gov-
ernment interest in maintaining societal norms. Moreover, although in-
dividual interests are weighted on both sides of the scale, individual
choice is maximized by protecting religious group self-definition. Defi-
nitional balancing, then, would suggest that the balance of individual,
government, and religious group interests implicated by religious group
discrimination in membership decisions generally should be struck in
favor of religious group autonomy.266
3. THE LIMITS OF DEFINITIONAL BALANCING
In a recent critique of balancing as an analytic tool of constitu-
tional adjudication, Alexander Aleinikoff has argued that definitional
balancing provides certainty in the protection of important constitu-
tional interests only at the cost of reduced theoretical coherence.267 The
value of definitional balancing is that it defines how the balance of com-
peting interests should be struck in every case, once and for all, so that
MARY L. REV. 205 (1987) (discussing Rawls, Ackerman, and Dworkin). See generally R. SMITH,
supra note 83 (arguing that the liberalism implicit in American constitutional law prefers certain
substantive values over others); supra note 260.
264. See, e.g., Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment
Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979); Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Lim-
its of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980). See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERN-
MENT SPEAKS (1983).
265. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-60 & n.10 (1973); City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986). Within the limits of its assumption that
pornography has a "depressing" effect on society, the Court has sought to enhance individual
choice by cultivating rather than reducing pluralism. It has avoided the imposition of a nationwide
decency standard in favor of locally determined standards. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 30, 32-33 & n.13 (1973). These pornography cases suggest that the paternalistic regulatory
interest is legitimate in American constitutional law only when used to enhance pluralism and
individual choice.
266. But see Marshall, supra note 35, at 100-01 (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)) ("If the state can go into the bedroom to enforce morality in the absence of a recog-
nized countervailing constitutional interest, there would seem little to stop it from" intruding upon
virtually any organization.).
267. Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 979.
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application of the rule of decision in subsequent cases yields a clear
resolution.268 However, the claim that definitional balancing provides
a certainty of protection that overrides the cost that an individual case's
balance will not match the definitional balance is itself merely a "meta-
balance" that is empirically unproved, and probably unprovable.26 a
Moreover, definitional balances are often undermined by courts when
the equities of a particular case cut against the definitional balance.
"New situations present new interests and different weights for old in-
terests. If these are allowed to re-open the balancing process, then every
case becomes one of an 'ad hoc' balance.... Balances are 'definitional'
only if the Court wants to stop thinking about the question."-
270
This critique of definitional balancing is applicable to discrimina-
tory religious group membership decisions. There is no clear distinction
between the declining gradations of pressure on individual choice that
make withdrawal from religious group membership possible or not. In-
evitably there will come the case of religious group discrimination, not
amounting to physical or economic coercion, that nevertheless cries out
for government intervention.27 1 In analogous situations involving
other areas of constitutional law, the Court has found the temptation to
redefine the definitional balance irresistible, notwithstanding the impor-
tance of the constitutional values that the balance was defined to pro-
tect in the first place.27 2 Given the relatively precarious place of reli-
gious groups in modem politics and society, there seems to be an
especially high risk that any definitional balance drawn to protect the
religious group interest in self-definition might eventually slide back
into ad hoc balancing. Thus, although definitional balancing appears to
be a clear improvement on ad hoc balancing, it may in the long run
offer only marginally more protection for the religious group self-defi-
nitional interest. One must look elsewhere for significant protection of
the self-definitional interest.273
268. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34.
269. Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 979.
270. Id. at 980-81 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 962, 977.
271. For example, a religious or fraternal organization such as a Masonic lodge, where
membership is helpful for professional advancement in a small community, but is not necessary for
economic survival. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
272. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (libel); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Miranda warnings).
273. However, the refusal to strike a general balance between the self-definitional interest
of religious groups against the interest of individuals and government need not result in absolute
protection for self-definition. See infra text accompanying notes 283-95.
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C. Beyond Balancing
1. A CATEGORICAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFINITION
Justice Brennan may not be advocating a definitional balance to
resolve conflicts of individual, government, and religious group inter-
ests. As I have discussed, religious groups are valuable to society and to
individuals for at least three reasons. First, they protect the individual
freedom of their members against government encroachment by pro-
viding an effective vehicle for challenging governmental power.274 Sec-
ond, religious groups provide a context for the development of individ-
ual personality and identity that is considered important by the
substantial number of Americans who remain significantly committed
to religion and religious groups. 275 Finally, because liberal democratic
government is in theory severely constrained from both creating and
advocating particular conceptions of morality, religious groups are part
of a larger collection of necessary social institutions that create and
maintain the values by which Americans choose to live their lives. 2 7 6
One may properly describe religious groups, then, as indeed Justice
Brennan seems to,277 as an indispensable part of individual and social
life in the United States. Given the persistent and pervasive religiosity
of Americans, 278 religious groups may be as important as family and
sexual relationships. As such, the interest of religious groups in defining
themselves by controlling membership decisions merits strong constitu-
tional protection. Protection is warranted not because this interest out-
weighs competing individual and governmental interests, but because
religious groups are a locus for certain of the constitutive, foundational
activities by which Americans define and determine who and what they
are, both individually and communally.279 Just as autonomy and soci-
274. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82, 96.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85, 99.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
277. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 342:
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participa-
tion in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition
of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.
Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization's religious mis-
sion, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a
means by which a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church's ability to
,do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often
furthers individual religious freedom as well.
Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
278. See supra notes 1, 3.
279. Cf. R. SMITH, supra note 83, at 46 ("liberalism is said to be wrong not only in seeing
people as fundamentally isolated individuals but also in failing to recognize that true human hap-
piness comes only in man's common life"); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Eco-
nomic Efficiency, 98 HARv. L. REv. 592, 618 (1985) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitutional Calculus]:
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ety in general are inconceivable in the United States without familial
autonomy, procreational choice, and (hetero)sexual privacy, 280 so also
one cannot conceive of meaningful individual religious freedom unless
religious institutions are protected from government encroachment.28'
Indeed, the idea that the free exercise clause protects not only the free-
dom of individuals to believe, but also their freedom to constitute and
to preserve a community of belief, clearly underlies the institutional free
exercise cases.282
2. CATEGORICAL BOUNDARIES OF SELF DEFINITION: THEORY
The scholarly and judicial reflexes to constitutional balancing tests
in individual-government-religious group conflicts comes from the un-
derstandable inclination to avoid the tyranny and injustice that an ab-
solute rule of deference to religious group membership decisions seems
to entail. There is a sense, particularly among individuals who do not
consider themselves religious or who do not consider organized or pub-
lic religion a useful aspect of American life, that the right of religious
groups to autonomy in making membership decisions will result in an
overwhelming number of antisocial and otherwise self-interested acts
by such groups. 283 For example, the Internal Revenue Service seems to
have an undifferentiated fear that, in the absence of a narrow and re-
strictive definition of a religious-and therefore tax-exempt--organiza-
tion, large numbers of Americans will organize into bogus churches or
communes to evade the payment of federal income taxes. Yet, the pos-
sibility that such a phenomenon could evolve into a serious tax enforce-
ment problem is remote. Most of us do not want to be ministers, much
less found our own churches, and the thought that Americans will flock
to share their net worths with others in communal living situtations so
Speech must be "free" if there is to be a meeting ground for individuals, a place where
they can come together to work out the shared values-including the value of self-gov-
ernment itself-that will direct and enrich their lives.... mhe first amendment protects
our autonomy from the state precisely because speaking and choosing-rather than hav-
ing words uttered and choices made for us-are critical to the never-ending task of
reconstituting ourselves and our society.
See generally Frug, supra note 33, at 1125-26.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
281. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUs, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE RoLE OF MEDIATING STRUC-
TURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 26, 30-33 (1977); R. NEUHAUS, supra note 77, at 180; Howe, supra note 89,
at 94; cf. M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY 186-87 n.32 (1985)
("If individuals are to act or to be served effectively, account must be taken of the institutions that
shape our lives and our thinking.").
282. See supra text accompanying notes 175-91. See also Karst, Cultural Identity, supra
note 77, at 339.
283. Cf. Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 202, at 314 (religious exemptions from gener-
ally applicable legislation suggest "that a ready-made loophole exists for those who wish to de-
scribe themselves as religious adherents").
1989:99
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
as to reduce their tax bills is ridiculous.28 4 In other regulatory contexts,
courts often react with suspicion and even hostility to religious involve-
ment in traditionally secular activities. 28 To allow such fears to influ-
ence general law and social policy is to govern at the margin by permit-
ting fears of the catastrophic to overwhelm the legal analysis. 286 The
majority of nonprofit religious institutions in America exist and operate
not out of a desire for pecuniary or personal gain, but out of dedication
to the possibility of realizing a particular religious vision.28 7 It is both
cynical and naive to think that any appreciable number of Americans
would reorder their living and thinking in accordance with the generally
restrictive and unmodern belief structures of many contemporary
American religious traditions solely for commercial or profit-making
advantage. For most Americans, religious and non-religious alike, reli-
gious community and belief are serious commitments, and a person is
unlikely to subject oneself to their continuing influence without a sin-
cere and solid determination that this is required by one's personal
conscience.
Certainly, religious groups may engage in conduct that ought to be
outlawed or regulated, and the argument that follows takes adequate
account of the possibility of such conduct. Nevertheless, the constitu-
tional validity or utility of a right of religious group autonomy should
not depend to a significant extent on the fact that the right might be
abused by a small minority of religious groups. Most religious groups
in the United States contribute much of value to society as well as to
their individual members. Unless and until religious communities and
individuals that abuse civil liberties become numerous and common-
place, they should not be the measure of the legitimacy and viability of
any religious group right.
An absolute rule of deference need not lead to religious tyranny or
injustice so long as the boundaries of the right to religious group self-
definition are clearly marked. The rule remains absolute, but only
within those spheres in which it applies. Such a rule is thus categorical
as well as absolute.288 The exceptions do not result from a balance of
interests, but from "a principle internal to the constitutional
provision."'2 89
284. See generally Weithorn & Turkel, Frontier Issues of Tax Exemption for Religious
Organizations, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, supra note 14, at 64.
285. See, e.g., NLRB v. Salvation Army of Mass. Dorchester Day Care, 763 F.2d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 1985); King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996
(1974). See also supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
286. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978); accord Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 1000.
287. Cf. Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 & n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring).
288. C. FRIED, supra note 286, at 10.
289. Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 1080; accord Frantz, supra note 220, at 1434-36.
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Two concepts, voluntarism and value-creation, are useful in artic-
ulating the boundaries within which a right to religious group self-defi-
nition should operate absolutely. The importance of religious groups to
individual and social life, which gives the groups their strong claim to
constitutional protection, is intertwined with the assumption that the
creation or maintenance of an individual's membership in such groups
is voluntary.29 ° The protection against governmental tyranny that is
offered by a religious group to its members is of little personal value to
one who is being coerced to join or to stay within the group. People in
such situations need government intervention and protection.29 ' Simi-
larly, it makes little sense to speak of the contribution of religious
groups to personality development when the group is forcing its norm
of individual identity on a member who does not wish to stay within the
group. Accordingly, deference to a religious group's membership deci-
sions is not appropriate in any situation in which group members are
not free to leave the group. The social and individual values that give
religious groups a claim to a right to autonomy in such decisions cannot
be realized in the absence of voluntary association by group members.
Value-creation is a second concept useful in charting the limits of
religious autonomy in membership decisions. Much of the argument in
this Article in support of a religious group right to self-definition could
apply to nonreligious groups. Yet, many such groups do not protect the
individual from government tyranny, or provide referents for personal-
ity development, or contribute to moral pluralism. Although useful so-
cial and individual tasks are often facilitated by such groups, in only the
rarest of circumstances do they form the foundation of an individual's
self-concept or provide a significant check on state power. Indeed, such
organizations are usually parasitic with respect to their group values.
They do not originate or create values, but only reflect values that have
their origin in more foundational groups.292 Thus, they are carriers
rather than creators of meaning.
The moral values that inhere in the communal life of religious
groups are the result of the fact that such groups normally create rather
290. Of course, many important relationships in American society are not voluntary in
the sense that the individuals who are parties to these relationships have made a free and conscious
decision to enter into them. Kinship relationships and membership in churches that practice infant
or youth baptism are both examples of groups whose members did not make an initial voluntary
decision to join the group. Yet membership in such groups is voluntary in the sense that their
members can choose whether to continue their membership in the group, and they have the power
to sever their relationship if they so wish.
291. See Laycock, supra note 57, at 1405; Pepper, supra note 95, at 933; cf. Karst, Intimate
Association, supra note 138, at 637 ("It is the choice to form and maintain an intimate association
that permits full realization of the associational values we cherish most.... [I]ntimacy implies the
choice not to associate oneself in intimate ways with the world at large.") (emphasis in original).
292. See generally P. BatGER & R. NEuHAus, supra note 281, at 34 (defining voluntary
associations as groups formed to pursue specific goals "for some collective purpose").
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than merely reflect values. Religious groups are among those institu-
tions in American society that teach people to find and to nurture per-
sonal meaning and value in their individual lives.293 Indeed, given the
continuing and pervasive influence of religious traditions in the lives of
many Americans, religious groups must be considered to be among the
most significant sources of American values.2 9 4 Accordingly, the prin-
ciple of religious group autonomy in membership decisions should be
extended to other groups only to the extent that they create values that
significantly and positively affect individuals and society. 295 Also, to
the extent that one can identify a religious group as parasitic upon
rather than creative of values, deference to the membership decisions of
such a group may not be appropriate.
3. CATEGORICAL BOUNDARIES OF SELF-DEFINITION: PRACTICE
However valid and useful voluntarism, value-creation, or other
concepts may prove to be in defining the theoretical limits of absolute
deference to religious group membership decisions, substantial diffi-
culty in translating the theoretical concepts into judicially manageable
standards remains. This is a problem common to all subjects of consti-
tutional theory,2 9 6 although the Court has not always admitted it.
29 7
Because of this difficulty, Lawrence Sager argues that the rules of
decision formulated by the Supreme Court to protect constitutional
norms need not coincide with the theoretical limits of such norms. 2 98 In
Sager's view, it is often necessary that certain constitutional norms be
293. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus have labeled such institutions "mediating struc-
tures" because they are interposed between the individual and the giant bureaucracies that domi-
nate modern society. Id. at 2-3. They identify neighborhoods, families, and certain voluntary as-
sociations, as well as religious groups, as mediating structures. Id. at 8-40. For an argument that
public schools are mediating structures, see Hafen, supra note 43.
294. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 274-82. Religious groups are not the only groups
in the United States capable of creating and maintaining values. See, e.g., Lynd, Communal Rights,
62 TEx. L. REv. 1417, 1423 (1984) (describing feelings of brotherhood and solidarity shared among
members of trade union locals). Certainly, however, there are not many secular groups in the
United States that can claim as strong an influence on the lives of their members as American
religious groups have on their members. See generally Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 85, at 1591-
94.
295. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1420.
296. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (distinguishing a statement
"which attempts to describe an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution" from one "which
attempts to translate such an ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues").
297. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. i, 18 (1958).
298. Sager, State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitu-
tional Law, 63 TEX. L. Rev. 959, 962-63 (1985) [hereinafter Sager, Norms and Rules]. See also
Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 296.
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"overenforced" by the Court.2 9 9 In such cases, the Court should make
a conscious, strategic decision to ensure that there is no impediment to
full exercise of the constitutional norm to its conceptual limits; this is
implemented by extending protection to activities that in fact lie outside
the norm's theoretical boundaries.30 0
Justice Brennan articulates similar strategic concerns in his Amos
concurrence. He would allow Congress to extend statutory protection
to all of the activities of religious groups even though conceptually his
norm of religious group autonomy in self-definition justifies only pro-
tection of the group's religious activities. 30 ' Because of the difficulty of
distinguishing the religious from the secular on a case-by-case basis,
Justice Brennan would protect all activities of such groups to ensure
that the religious group autonomy norm is fully realized to its theoreti-
cal limits. 30 2
299. Sager, Norms and Rules, supra note 298, at 963-71 (discussing doctrines of equal
protection, first amendment overbreadth, establishment clause standing, and constitutional crimi-
nal procedure).
300. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (to survive, free-
doms of expression must have "breathing space" that can be purchased only by allowing some
defamatory falsehoods to go unpunished). See also Sager, Norms and Rules, supra note 298, at 964.
Similarly, Kenneth Karst has concluded that complete and meaningful protection of the caring,
love, and fulfillment values inherent in intimate associations necessitates the extension of constitu-
tional protection to casual, as well as enduring sexual relationships, even though the former ex-
hibit none of these intimate associational values.
Tlhe value of commitment is fully realizable only in an atmosphere of freedom to choose
whether a particular association will be fleeting or enduring. A doctrinal system ex-
tending the freedom of intimate association only to cases of enduring commitment would
require intolerable inquiries into subjects that should be kept private, including states of
mind.
Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 138, at 633 & n.45.
301.
We are willing to countenance [religious discrimination] because we deem it vital that, if
certain activities constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a religious or-
ganization should be able to require that only members of its community perform those
activities.
This rationale suggests that, ideally, religious organizations should be able to dis-
criminate on the basis of religion only with respect to religious activities .... This is
because the infringement on religious liberty that results from conditioning performance
of secular activity upon religious belief cannot be defended as necessary for the commu-
nity's self-definition. Furthermore, .... it puts at the disposal of religion the added advan-
tages of economic leverage in the secular realm.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
302.
Nonprofit activities.., are most likely to present cases in which characterization
of the activity as religious or secular will be a close question. If there is a danger that a
religious organization will be deterred from classifying as religious those activities it ac-
tually regards as religious, it is likely to be in this domain. This substantial potential for
chilling religious activity ... justifies a categorical exemption for nonprofit activities.
Such an exemption ... permits infringement on employee Free Exercise rights in those
instances in which discrimination is most likely to reflect a religious community's self-
definition. While every nonprofit activity may not be operated for religous purposes, the
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Strategic analysis is very close to definitional balancing. 303 It dif-
fers, however, in at least one significant respect. In strategic analysis,
the Court's attention is focused on the theoretical limits of the constitu-
tional norm, whereas in definitional balancing, the Court is looking to
other interests that may compete with those advanced by the norm. The
goal of strategic analysis is not to reach correct balances of constitu-
tional interests, but rather to attempt to discern where a constitutional
right ends and to take account of the limitations of the judicial office in
protecting and enforcing the right to the point of theoretical exhaus-
tion. 3°0 In doing so, the Court must decide how important the right is
in a more absolute sense than is required in definitional balancing. In
definitional balancing, the Court must decide which of several compet-
ing interests is most important relative to the others; in strategic analy-
sis, the Court must decide whether and why the right is so critical that it
cannot be left underenforced, or even threatened with under-
enforcement.305
Categorical rights and strategic analysis are preferable to defini-
tional balancing, then, in one important respect: By forcing the Court
to articulate expressly why a general rule does not apply to a particular
situation, the Court avoids the temptation to backslide into ad hoc bal-
ancing that is constantly present in a definitional balance.30 6 When the
Court "recalculates" a definitional balance, the factors driving the re-
calculation are obscured by the posture of weighing competing inter-
ests. If the right is categorical, those factors must be laid bare.
Categorical rights and strategic analysis thus preserve the "voice"
of constitutional adjudication. In a phrase often repeated but little un-
likelihood that many are makes a categorical rule a suitable means to avoid chilling the
exercise of religion.
Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
303. Compare TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 887 & n.7 (describing indi-
vidual and government interests that conflict with first amendment interests in constitutional libel
litigation) with Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 1001 & n.322 (New York Times v. Sullivan does not
balance competing interests in arriving at the standard of "actual malice"); also compare TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 1038 (overbreadth doctrine reflects a definitional balance)
with Sager, Norms and Rules, supra note 298, at 968 ("A substantially overbroad statute is thought
to 'chill' exercise of the rights of free expression to such an extent that killing it off at the earliest
moment ofjudicial recognition becomes highly desirable. The Court thus extends a strategic right
to the overbreadth claimant, in service of the true rights of third parties."). The argument that
strategic analysis is only balancing in disguise is not very helpful, because at some level of abstrac-
tion the very act of lawmaking always entails an implicit balance of interests. See, e.g., Tribe,
Constitutional Calculus, supra note 279, at 608 ("any means of enforcing the fourth amendment
will necessarily lead to the capture and punishment of fewer criminals") (emphasis in original).
304. Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 1000 n.314; see C. FRIED, supra note 286, at 9-10.
305. See Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 279, at 596 (arguing that utilitarianism
is flawed because it focuses on cost efficiency while failing to take account of personal, cultural and
historical imperatives). See generally Frantz, supra note 220, at 1435.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 267-73.
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derstood, Chief Justice Marshall reminded those of his era of the spe-
cial character of constitutional adjudication.3" 7 Constitutional adjudi-
cation seeks to identify and articulate the principles upon which our
political community is and continues to be constituted. It is not a search
for rational accommodations, nor one for efficient solutions to public
policy dilemmas. It is instead a search for individual and communal
identity, because the principles upon which individuals constitute and
reconstitute themselves and the community to which they belong reveal
who and what they and the community are.3"'
In its constitutional mode, then, the Supreme Court is prophetic in
the Old Testament sense, calling us to examine and reexamine our polit-
ical premises.3a ° This is a valuable attribute of constitutional adjudica-
tion that is worth preserving. However much strategic analysis of cate-
gorical rights may look like definitional balancing, the former preserves
the constitutional voice of the Court. This is one difference which
strongly recommends strategic analysis over definitional balancing.
D. Beyond Rights?
Balancing and rights hardly exhaust the possibilities for protecting
religious group autonomy. Some commentators have criticized the
mindset of traditional legal scholarship that has become unwilling or
unable to conceive of political community and legal relationships with-
out the language of rights. More fruitful ways to think about commu-
nity and relationships might be opened by focusing, for example, on
307. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 422 (1819) ("we must never forget,
that it is a constitution we are expounding").
308. Aleinikoff, supra note 234, at 993, 1002; Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note
279, at 618. See also Frantz, supra note 220, at 1440.
309. A leading proponent of such a role for the Supreme Court is Michael Perry, who has
argued that non-interpretive, counter-majoritarian review by the Court is functionally justified in
human rights cases. See M. PERRY, TiHE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 4
(1982). Because it is insulated from the day-to-day political pressures that beset the other branches
of government, the Court is institutionally suited to force us to consider carefully the resolution of
"fundamental political-moral problems," whereas the executive and congressional branches, dom-
inated by a concern for incumbency, reflexively invoke "established moral conventions" when
dealing with such problems. Id. at 100-02. The Court's function in human rights cases is to provide
the possibility for moral growth in the American political community, thereby enabling us "to
maintain a tolerable accommodation between ... our democratic commitment and ... the possi-
bility that there may indeed be right answers-discoverable right answers-to fundamental politi-
cal-moral problems." Id. at 102 (emphasis in original). By requiring the majority to "think twice"
before taking action that negatively affects human rights, the Court enhances the chances that the
majority will indeed make the morally correct choice. Id. at 111-14. Judicial review is thus the
"institutionalization of prophecy." Id. at 98. See also id. at 101. But see also id. at 125 (discussing
limitations of the biblical metaphor). Professor Perry has further developed this idea in his recent
book, M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW ch. 6 (1988) (arguing that the Court should act to
facilitate moral dialogue).
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individual responsibility, social solidarity, or civic virtue.31 ° Even the
most strongly worded judicial language cannot defend constitutional
rights against a culture that does not value them.31 l
Even if this "rights critique ' '3 12 is valid, it does not follow that the
development of a jurisprudence of religious group rights is pointless.
The creation of a viable society premised on its members' performance
of legally unenforceable obligations will require a dramatic change in
the way we habitually think about ourselves and act toward others. 1 s
Proponents of the rights critique have generally been much clearer
about the vices of rights talk than they have about how we might get
along without it.31
4
More importantly, rights currently make up a significant part of
the American political reality. Because there is a reciprocal relationship
between our constituted realities and our beliefs, 315 a strong right of
310. See, e.g., Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); Macneil, Exchange Revisited. Individual Utility and
Social Solidarity, 96 ETHics 567 (1986); Oaks, Rights and Responsibilities, 36 MERCER L. Rev. 427
(1985). See generally A Critique of Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363 (1984). See also R. NIEBUHR, supra
note 54, at 171 ("the law ... does not command that we seek our neighbor's good but that we
respect his rights").
311. Lynd, supra note 294, at 1434. For example, although Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), was a rallying point for civil rights groups, genuine recognition of civil rights for
blacks was gained only after the mobilization of black political power in the 1960s and the emer-
gence of a political consensus outside the South that segregation was wrong. See Bachman, Law-
yers, Law and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 17-21 (1985).
312. Those who criticize rights differ considerably among themselves on what the criti-
cism is. The critique of rights encompasses at least the observation that the conceptual structure of
rights theory is limited and imperfect in protecting human freedom. Often this point is pressed
further with the argument that rights are fatally misleading and destructive of freedom because
they mask social conflict and provide a vehicle for those in power to perpetuate their domination
of others. In its most extreme form, the rights critique holds that rights unavoidably alienate the
rights holder from others, and thus cannot be used to create and preserve meaningful human
freedom. For examples of rights criticism, see Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363
(1984) [hereinafter Tushnet, Essay on Rights]; Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness
and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563 (1984). For a summary of the ap-
proaches of various scholars to the critique of rights, see Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights,
Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509, 516-22 (1984).
313. See, e.g., Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701,736-38 (1986)
(suggesting that potential religious clause litigants, including the government, defer to the beliefs
and actions of those with whom they disagree, even to the point of foregoing a legal challenge or
defense to which they would otherwise be entitled). See also R. NIEBUHR, supra note 54, at 30 ("If
community in basic terms is established by various organic forces of history, it must finally be
preserved by mutual forbearance and forgiveness.").
314. Professor Tushnet responds to this criticism by arguing that one cannot predict what
a "right-less" society will be like before it arrives and that, in any event, our current rights-domi-
nated society is so bad that pulling it down and starting over without a clear alternative in mind is
not likely to create anything much worse. Tushnet, Essay on Rights, supra note 312, at 1363, 1398-
1402.
315. Lynd, supra note 294, at 1434; Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire
(Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 637, 664 & n.153 (1987).
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religious group autonomy in membership decisions may result in more
widespread recognition in the United States of the social and individual
value of religious groups.
Under current religion clause jurisprudence, adjudication of reli-
gion clause disputes between the government and religious groups is
often perceived by the groups as a zero-sum game. The vindication of
interests asserted by the government results in an immediate and recip-
rocal intrusion on the interests asserted by the group. The sensitivity of
religious groups in this area is not totally unfounded. From their per-
spective, the twentieth century has been one long march of ever-increas-
ing government hostility and intrusion. The application of the religion
clauses to the states in the 1940s and the Supreme Court's subsequent
development of their doctrinal underpinnings quickened the pace,
heightening the awareness of many religious groups of the damaging
potential of government pressure on core religious group concerns.
Accordingly, the response of many religious groups to any govern-
ment regulation is often automatic intransigence. This response only
highlights the dark side of religious group action and confirms the views
of those who have little use for religion in the modern world. For the
government's part, consistent assertion by some religious groups of idi-
osyncratic or anti-social behavior that threatens the power and effec-
tiveness of government suggests that the government ought to exercise
its enforcement power to nip in the bud even the faintest suggestions of
religious anarchy.
The creation of a categorical right of self-definition for religious
groups would force upon the government the recognition that religious
groups are a foundational unit of American society.3 16 Eventually, this
recognition would be reflected in American political culture. With reli-
gious group freedom thus protected, perhaps the reflexive and self-in-
terested response of religious groups to state regulatory initiatives
would diminish and be replaced by a less self-centered and more politi-
cally mature understanding of government regulatory needs and inter-
ests. 317 This, in turn, might abate the widespread suspicion that the
absence of regulation perpetuates antisocial behavior under the guise of
religious group freedom. Certainly a mutual respect by church and state
316. Cf. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 85, at 1617:
A judiciary that is compelled even formally to confront religion qua religion-that is, not
as the negation of reason, or a purely subjective preference, but as a spiritual and tran-
scendent vision as compelling to its adherents as the empirical proofs of modern sci-
ence-must eventually come to acknowledge the functional reality of religion in the lives
of most Americans and, therefore, its social relevance.
317. Cf. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,636-37 (1943) ("Assurance
that rights are secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and by making us
feel safe to live under it makes for its better support.").
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for the indispensable role filled by each would protect religious group
freedom far better than the most forcefully articulated legal right..
In sum, ad hoc balancing provides no protection for the religious
group interest in self-definition. Definitional balancing seems to pro-
vide some protection, but carries with it the constant danger of sliding
back into ad hoc balancing. Moreover, balancing of any sort obscures
the crucial issues at stake with the pretense of weighing the unweigh-
able. Defining the religious group interest in self-definition by means of
a categorical right delineated by voluntarism and value-creation best
protects that interest, by focusing judicial attention on the values con-
tributed by religious groups to society and to individuals, and on how
these values shape the contours of the right.
VI. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that allowing religious groups an absolute
freedom to set the terms of membership, looking only to assure that the
autonomy of disaffected members and nonmembers can meaningfully
be exercised through withdrawal and alternative group affiliations, will
result in the protection of beliefs and practices that will be inconsistent
with and even repugnant to the majority."1 8 This is the paradox of
groups. They both enhance and subvert individual autonomy by chal-
lenging the sovereign power of the liberal state. Permitting the govern-
ment to force fundamental change upon or to prohibit altogether cer-
tain kinds of groups because, in its judgment, such groups spawn a
diffuse social harm or threaten the implementation of majoritarian so-
cial policy, is a subversion of the pluralist thesis. If the government can
act to eliminate groups that it believes threaten majoritarian social poli-
cies and values merely because such groups are anti-majoritarian, then
the power of the government over groups and individuals is unlimited.
If one is genuinely concerned about threats to individual freedom,
the pertinent question is whether individuals have more to fear from
governmental power than they do from religious group autonomy. 19
Some of the framers of the Constitution and their contemporaries
feared collective religious action as much as the power of centralized
318. The perception of the frequency with which this actually occurs, however, may be
exaggerated by a tendency to "catastrophize" potential abuses of religious group power. See supra
text accompanying notes 283-87.
319. Cf Frug, supra note 33, at 1123:
[O]ne should not make the mistake of denying the force of the liberal attack against
[decentralized power]. Independent corporate power of any kind does threaten
individuals....
Our only option is to choose which danger to liberty [that is, the elimination of
groups or their infringement on individuals] seems more tolerable, more controllable, or
more worth defending.
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government.32 ° Many of the framers were particularly concerned
about the unification of religion and centralized government.3 21 Hav-
ing emerged from the political and social debris of the post-Reforma-
tion wars, the framers should be applauded for heeding the lessons of
their own history while eschewing attempts to predict the cultural and
political future. However, in the two centuries since the Convention of
1787, national power has grown far beyond the wildest imaginations of
even the most ardent Federalists, while the feared unification of church
and national state has never come to pass. Even at the state and local
level, church-state contacts have substantially decreased since the ratifi-
cation of the Bill of Rights. 322 This decrease has been accelerated by the
Supreme Court's activism in establishment clause jurisprudence since
World War II.
Whatever the dangers to individual freedom presented by religious
groups, they are substantially less threatening than those currently
posed by the inexorable expansion of the modern American liberal
state. The individual autonomy and freedom that are at the heart of
liberalism would be well served by strong constitutional protection of
religious group autonomy in membership decisions.
320. E.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 & 51 (J. Madison); see L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 107-08 (1986) (describing state ratification de-
bates); id. at 101-02 (describing Madison's and Jefferson's anti-establishment activities in Vir-
ginia); and supra text accompanying notes 105-08. Jefferson, although strictly speaking not a
framer of the Constitution, had a deep fear of the influence that institutional religion could exer-
cise on government at all levels. See M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND Ta WILDERNESS 8passim (1965);
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8 1, at 1159; Pepper, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 258,
at 301.
Certainly, morality without religion was foreign to the world of the framers. See R. SMITH,
supra note 83, at 209; S. Smith, supra note 211, at 18-19. But the religion of that world was individ-
ual and private, not collective and public. See Pepper, The Free Exercise Clause, supra note 258, at
304-06; and supra text accompanying notes 105-08. See also U.S. CoNST. art. VI (prohibiting reli-
gious tests for federal office). Accordingly, the views of those who lived during this period can be
cited as persuasive authority by both sides in religion clause litigation. See Van Patten, Standing in
the Need of Prayer? The Supreme Court on James Madison and Religious Liberty, 3 BENCHMARK 59,
59-60 (1987) (discussing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
321. L. LEVY, supra note 320, at 63-89 passim.
322. See generally E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE DEVELOP-
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